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This thesis is a study of the feasibility of manning the
airwings of a fifteen carrier force by FY 1990. An initial
review of the history of the carrier force and the composition
of its airwings and the manpower requirements needed to man
them was accomplished. Manpower studies were conducted of
the 131X/132X designators for officers and for eleven selected
enlisted aviation ratings (AD, AE, AME, AMH, AMS , AO, AW, AT,
AW, AX and PR) . Specific predictive information used included
personnel attrition, retention, promotion and accession data.
All of this information was processed by an APL computer pro-
gram designated MANMOD, which allowed projection of manpower
requirements and personnel supply data forward to the year
1990. The MANMOD model permitted estimation of the acces-
sions and retention requirements for the officer designators
and enlisted ratings chosen for study. This projection of
data provided predictions on whether current-day policies
will meet future billet requirements or whether changes in
policies will have to be made in order to man a fifteen-
carrier force. This thesis indicates serious problems in
manning if present supply and requirements trends continue.
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The manning of the all-volunteer force has been a problem
since its inception. Without the draft to produce a steady
flow of personnel into the armed forces, it has become neces-
sary for those in command to examine, in depth, the adminis-
trative policies which affect the maintenance of a strong,
peace-time volunteer force. In the face of the present
administration's avowed commitment to expand the size of the
Navy to a six hundred ship force, which will embody a fifteen
aircraft carrier complement, the feasibility of providing
trained personnel for such a force by FY 1990 becomes a
critical question.
This thesis addresses itself to the study of the airwings
of the FY 1990 fifteen carrier force. Its purpose is to dis-
cover whether the projected billet requirements can be met,
and to identify serious problem areas. Such a study is of
potential value to the Navy in that it identifies those rates
and designators which may have personnel shortfalls over the
next decade.
To accomplish this study, a review was initially made of
past and present data relating to three major factors which
control the effective manning of all the armed services:
attrition, retention and accession.
12

The cost, both in financial terms and in operational
readiness, of the attrition rate cannot be minimized, nor
can the impact of low retention rates through both the
pyramidical officer rank structure and the enlisted struc-
ture. The shortage of mid-management personnel, especially
in the aviation community, is a matter of great concern.
The civilian aviation job market virtually relies on the
military to train its technicians and pilots. Low enlisted
pay scales, particularly in the first few years of service,
and the noncommensurate salaries paid to aviators, coupled
with various other factors such as family separations, have
combined to make the offer of civilian employment attractive.
Civilian aviation expansion projections for the next decade
offer no decline in demand for trained and experienced
personnel.
Beyond the question of attrition and retention is the
problem of accessing sufficient personnel to compensate for
losses and to provide needed growth. As this thesis will
state, the pool of potential officers and enlistees is shrink-
ing rapidly over the upcoming ten years at the very time when
demand for personnel is seen as sharply increasing.
An APL program designated MANMOD was utilized in this
thesis to project personnel accession, retention and attri-
tion data to the year 1990 in order to provide predictions
of areas of personnel shortages or overages in the fifteen-
carrier airwing manning complement. This model allows for
13

the determination of the impacts of changes in accession,
retention, promotion and attrition on future manpower
availability.
The next chapter of this thesis investigates the size
and role of today's carrier force and its present airwing
manning status. It will also discuss the proposed future
carrier strength requirements. Chapter III will present a
study of past and present aviation officer and enlisted
retention and attrition data. Chapter IV will utilize the
APL program MANMOD to predict aviation officer and enlisted
supply vs. demand in FY 1990, using billet numbers, and
accession, attrition, retention and promotion rates as var-
iables. Finally, in Chapter V, conclusions are drawn con-




II. NATURE OF PROBLEM
Every branch of the Armed Forces must, by definition,
operate to fill the defense needs of this country as set out
by the Department of Defense and, further, do so within the
confines of the budgetary restrictions placed upon it by the
Congress. The Navy, no less than any of its fellow services,
has over the years undergone changes mandated by the various
administrations in response to their views of the perceived
threat to this country.
It is not surprising, then, to find that in the course
of these years the demands and expectations placed upon the
Navy have varied with the state of foreign relations, national
opinion, technological progress and economic constraints.
The United States Navy in FY 81 finds itself with a mul-
titude of present and future manpower problems. Retention
of trained personnel and recruitment of suitable potential
rated personnel and officers has become of crucial concern
to the service, particularly in light of the latest fleet
force projections outlined by the Secretary of the Navy
(SECNAV)
. John Lehman, Jr. , the present Secretary of the
Navy, stated [Ref . 1]
:
We are at a major turning point in the history of our
nation, with a new turn in policy which includes a
stronger Navy. The President is totally committed to
a stronger naval force to cover a three ocean require-
ment and protect the sea lanes.
15

We will have a 600-ship Navy built around fifteen
battle groups.
A. CARRIER FORCE
Two decades ago the carrier force numbered 24; of that
number 15 were considered attack carriers (CV's or CVN's
for' nuclear powered types) and 9 were anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) carriers.
Table I shows there has been a slow and steady decline in
the number of carriers from 1964 until the present force of
only 13 CV/CVN's [Ref. 2]. This in itself might be considered
unusual because the time frame encompassed the Viet Nam con-
flict. The naval force remained fairly steady until the
withdrawal of American support from Viet Nam, and then there
was a steady decline in the number of Navy ships [Ref. 3]
.
This steady decline in ships of all types, not only in air-
craft carriers, is more dramatically shown in Figure 1 where
the total active fleet force of ships can be seen to bottom
out at around 415 in number [Ref. 4] . In a decade and a half,
the number of ships was reduced by slightly over 54 percent.
The number of ships planned was on the increase during the
Ford administration, but shipbuilding cuts by the Carter ad-
ministration reduced the number of ships projected for the
1990' s [Ref. 5]. Included in this shipbuilding budget cut was
a CVN. Since this thesis deals with the manning of carrier
airwings in particular, it is worthy of mention that inherent
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Source: Estimates of Military Officer Force Structure
Required to Man the Projected Naval Combatant










reduction in requirements for airwing personnel, both officer
and enlisted.
B. CARRIER ROLE
Another factor leading to the present situation was a
change in the naval carrier role. The last of the World War
II (WW II) carriers used for ASW left active service in FY 73.
Until this time there had been two types of aircraft carriers,
or rather, two different roles for an aircraft carrier. The
main role was to project airpower, accomplished with the
fighter and attack aircraft of the attack carrier [Ref . 6]
.
The second role was ASW. The ASW carrier's job was to aid
in protection of the attack carriers from the submarine threat.
This job, ASW, was also given to other ships, but the CVS '
s
could extend this protection further from the CV/CVN's. The
ASW ships were also part of the air defense net covering the
CV/CVN's from air attacks [Ref. 7].
In order to keep the extended coverage that ASW aircraft
could give the carrier, the two roles were combined into a
single carrier operation. Carriers were required to carry
fighter, attack and ASW aircraft. This, of course, reduced
the number of fighters and attack aircraft, and therefore
decreased the amount of projected power a CV/CVN could pro-
duce [Ref. 8]. To correct this deficit, the Navy asked for
and received, after constant Congressional battles, larger
and larger carriers until reaching the Nimitz class carriers




C. PRESENT CARRIER FORCE
Figure 2 shows the present carrier force level and the
projected force strength through year 2010 [Ref . 10] . The
aircraft carrier Lexington (ATV-16) operates as a training
carrier and is not counted as one of the 13 CV/CVN's.
In 1983, the Coral Sea (CV-43) was to have taken over
the training carrier Lexington's role and become ATV-43. The
USS Vinson (CVN-70) , when commissioned in FY 82, would then
have maintained the carrier force strength at thirteen. The
last of the WW II type carriers, the Midway (CV-41) , would
have been decommissioned in FY 85, with the new CVN-71, as
yet unnamed, becoming operational to replace her. This would
have kept the force level at thirteen until the end of the
1990' s, at which time the retirement of the Forrestal (CV-59)
would have decreased the number to twelve. The new thirteenth
carrier to replace the Forrestal fell afoul of the Carter
administration's budget cuts [Ref. 11].
D. PRESENT AIRWING MANNING
In holding the carrier force steady in number, the number
of airwings would have also remained at its current level
(eleven airwings). (It should be explained that there are
only eleven airwings for thirteen carriers, because there are
usually two carriers in the Service Life Extension Program
(SLEP) )
. SLEP requires placing a carrier into a shipyard for
a period of approximately two years. At the present time,
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
YEARSNotes:
1. AVT-16 operates as a training ship and is based at Pensacola,
Florida. It is anticipated that CORAL SEA (43) will replace
LEXINGTON in the training role about 1983.
2. Tentative Service Life Extension Program under consideration
for these ships.
3. Tentative two year Service Life Extension Program Schedule.





its rehabilitation of aircraft carriers. At the time of
this writing, the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) has been in the
shipyard for almost three years.
E. PERCEIVED THREAT
While the United States has been decreasing the number
of ships in its Navy, the Soviets have been increasing
theirs, until they now have a superiority in number of fleet
ships. This superiority has changed the U.S. Government's
view on the size of our own Navy [Ref. 12]. Figure 3 shows
how perceived threat affects force structure and manning
structures [Ref. 13] . The Reagan administration is committed
to increasing our Navy from approximately 44 combat capable
ships presently to a force of 600 by the end of FY 90 [Ref.
14] . Why this sudden turn around? It is in response to the
belief that the Soviets have equalled, if not surpassed, the
U.S. in naval power. Following is part of a speech delivered
by Vice Admiral Ernest R. Seymore, Commander Naval Air Sys-
tems Command, as part of a briefing for industry [Ref. 15].
For years we have acknowledged that the Soviet Union
held a quantitative lead in military equipment, but be-
lieved that our qualitative lead would more than compen-
sate for this. It is time to reexamine that belief and
to reject the complacency that went with it.
During the decade of the 1970 's the Soviets made a
major advance in the development and production of defense
material and, as a consequence, will enter the 1980' s in
a dramatically different defense posture than they had as
they entered the 1970 's. Their objective was to chal-
lenge the United States lead in defense technology while
maintaining their numerical advantage. They have had
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by making an enormous investment, and by maintaining
an unwavering emphasis on technology.
In sum, we see the Soviets entering the decade of
the 1980' s with a commitment to compete in equality
with United States weapon systems.
This line of thought was also supported by the Secretary of
the Navy when asked for a frank appraisal of U.S. military
preparedness [Ref . 16]
.
Overall our capability today is in a very dangerous
position we have lost both our naval and strategic
nuclear edge of superiority. As an island nation we
must maintain military naval superiority.
I can assure you all today we are finished with
being second best.
F. PROPOSED CARRIER STRENGTH
To increase the Navy's size with new ships would take a
major effort in shipbuilding. Figure 4 shows a new projected
carrier force that will increase from thirteen to fifteen
attack carriers--which will be the nucleus of a fifteen
battle group force [Ref. 17]
.
In order to achieve this increase from thirteen to fif-
teen CV/CVN's, the Lexington (ATV-16) will remain the train-
ing carrier [Ref. 18]. The Coral Sea (CV-43) will enter
SLEP and continue on active duty as an attack carrier. This
will bring the carrier force up to fourteen when the Vinson
(CVN-70) makes its appearance in FY 82. The fifteenth
carrier would in all probability be the unnamed CVN-71.
To maintain the force at fifteen past FY 85, the Midway
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Notes: YEARS
1. AVT-16 continues to operate as a training ship.
2. CV-34 ORISKANY brought back into service
3. Tentative schedule (SLEP) under consideration for these ships.
4. Tentative two year SLEP schedule.
Source: Janes Fighting Ships 1980-1981 Edition , Franklin Watts Inc.,




SLEP at that time is not known. The Navy has also expressed
the desire to bring the Oriskany (CV-43) out of mothballs
and use it as an amphibious support ship manned by two
Marine A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft wings.
Table II shows the time schedule and manning levels
suggested by the Navy to Congress [Ref . 19] . This proposal
was not accepted for the FY 81 budget, but the Navy hopes
to again place it into the budget for FY 82, and this time
get it approved.
Table III shows the projected timetable for Naval car-
riers and for increases in other force levels [Ref. 20].
This table does not include the ATV carrier in its count.
A major problem the Navy faces in the increase in carrier
forces is providing the necessary manpower at the times
needed [Ref. 21]
.
With the Coral Sea (CV-43) remaining on line and the
Vinson (CVN-7 0) entering into service, the Navy already has
one airwing less than it needs. (By having two carriers in
SLEP and eleven active carriers, there is only a requirement
for eleven airwings. But, with having twelve active, there
would be a need for twelve airwings in order to have each
carrier perform its combined ship/airwing training prior to
deployment. One airwing could support two carriers, but this
would leave the airwing/squadrons without enough time for
their required one year of shore-based training.) A naval




MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ORISKANY
FY 82 FY 83
74 Officers/1285 Enlisted 116 Officers/2085 Enlisted
ORISKANY manpower requirements with an added 30 percent
standard factor for shore and sea billets other than those
billets required for squadron manning.
FY 82 FY 83
96 Officers/1671 Enlisted 151 Officers/2711 Enlisted
Airwing requirements vary with number and mix of aircraft
in wing.
Range of airwing options beginning in FY 83.
FY 83
Minimum (40 aircraft) 92 Officers/922 Enlisted
Maximum (60 aircraft) 189 Officers/1342 Enlisted
Range of airwing options with an added 3 percent standard
factor for shore and sea billets other than those billets re-
quired for squadron manning.
Minimum (40 aircraft) 120 Officers/1606 Enlisted
Maximum (56 aircraft) 247 Officers/1606 Enlisted
Total ORISKANY airwing manpower requirements with an added
30 percent factor for shore and sea billets other than those
billets required for squadron manning.
FY 82 FY 8 3
Minimum (40 aircraft) 96 Off/1671 Enl 271 Off/3946 Enl

































































vo ""T co vo ro cn
iH ^ 00 rH rH
vo *a» iH ^r oo en
rH ^r oo o o
00 CO rH rH
oo vo oo oo
r- oo H
oo vd oo oo
CN
in CN CN "3* VD <J\
rH 00 oo en o
in 00 OS rH
00 VO OO 00
o ^r
oo oo <T\
r^ «3« 00 CN rH






































Z Z u O Z CQ D D
> O G fa CO oo H 04 CO CO 0! J
u u a fa CO z MH w fa <\ \ \ \ \ co- 04 « En Eh T" Eh
> fl o Q fa CO co 2 z <| J Eh O











r-3 cH >iOCJ VO
U •H
CD T3 rH rd
•H 0)
M 4J 04 G
M 3 rd


















0) CD X CO
-a U CD
3 s-l CO 3
rH 3 O1
CD











CO fd +J CO
CD > CO CD
U
T3 • e p
C T3
T3 p H rd
C •H <H rd
(0 «••« CO > CD
^ u TD rd co
fa oo D CD Z U
fa I > p 33 > 3 a) CD
CO U £J3 O
*~* o -P -P
c rrj CD
•H X z 0>4J
z S3 rd Eh
> d
CO CD
U CO P CO
CO CD CO •
CO H CO £ rd H
0) . * <u rH CO
T3 ^o O T3 rd cn
3 rH 3 4-1 rHH 1 CO rH fd U
U Eh T3 T3 CD CD




• • • si fd c










as stated previously, Marine aviators are scheduled to man
the Oriskany's squadrons.
One reason the Navy has had to maintain only eleven air-
wings for thirteen carriers is the existence of the SLEP
program. If, however, the SLEP program is shortened so more
carriers can be deployed, a greater airwing shortage will
immediately be felt by the Navy. (If the SLEP program is
reduced to one year intervals in order for the United States
to cover all its carrier commitments, then there would have
to be one airwing for each carrier.) (An airwing can have
two deployments of six month duration and one year ashore
for training during a two-year SLEP program. In this way
airwings can move between ships and cover all commitments.
But if the SLEP program is lessened to one year, the air-
wing/squadrons would have to deploy with a particular carrier
and train ashore while that carrier was in SLEP. The airwing
would then be available to that carrier for their combined
ship/airwing training cycle.
.
This would not allow the air-
wing to be utilized on another carrier.) The suggestion that
SLEP may be changed and a greater number of airwings required
is based on the number of carriers needed to fulfill commit-
ments as listed by ocean: one in the North Atlantic for the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment, two in
the Mediterranean, one or two in the Indian Ocean, and at
least one, and perhaps two, in the Pacific Ocean. This would
entail a force anywhere from five to seven carriers at sea
29

at any given time. If the normal six-month deployment per
carrier is maintained with one carrier working up its air-
wing and the ship's new crew, one in the yards for overhaul,
with its airwing working its new personnel into the squadron,
then fifteen to twenty-one carriers would be needed to main-
tain the global commitments of the United States. (Prior
to the Soviet's placing ships in the Indian Ocean, the
standard carrier deployment length was six months. This
length of time was selected because it helped retention.
Longer deployments are said to cause higher attrition rates
because of family separation. At this time, the standard
deployment length is eight months, so that the United States
can keep a carrier in the Indian Ocean.)
To help meet the carrier commitment, the Navy has asked
for two more Nimitz class carriers to be approved and built
before the end of this decade. Congress may not want to
approve these large Nimitz class carriers, as in the past
they have favored smaller, less costly carriers. [Ref . 22]
.
The larger carriers have two roles, as previously stated,
attack and ASW, while at this time the smaller carriers could
only do one role effectively. Also, if Congress chose
smaller carriers, the surface Navy would require more man-
power to run these additional ships than to man a large,
single Nimitz class carrier. The average size crew for a
Nimitz class carrier is 3300 men, officers and enlisted,
whereas the smaller Forrestal class requires 2800 men.
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It seems, therefore, that it might take 5600 men to man the
two smaller ships which would be required to replace the
Nimitz class carrier.
G. MANNING
The approximate airwing manning levels needed to man
the present carrier force are shown in Table IV. It can be
seen that as the carrier class changes, so does the require-
ment for airwing manpower change. From the Midway class to
the larger Nimitz class carrier there is a required 32 per-
cent increase in number of officers and a 72 percent increase
in the enlisted force to support the new airwing. The num-
bers given are for maximum manpower requirements, and may
change depending on whether the carrier force wants fewer
or more attack aircraft. In other words, a carrier may
increase or decrease its deck load (number of aircraft a
carrier can accommodate) depending on its mission [Ref. 23].
To investigate thoroughly the manpower requirements of
the airwings, it is necessary to divide the personnel into
officer and enlisted, and to separate these by designator
and grade, and by rating and paygrade. The Squadron Manning
Documents (SQMD's) will be used for this purpose. First, it
is necessary to make a determination as to what type of
squadron will be used in a model airwing ' s composition.
Normally an airwing for a larger carrier (Nimitz class)




TYPICAL CARRIER AIRWING MANPOWER FORCE BREAKDOWN
CARRIER # TOTAL SIZE OFFICERS ENLISTED
LEXINGTON (16)
ORISKANY (34)
MIDWAY (41) 1800 270 1530
CORAL SEA (42) 1800 270 1530
FORRESTAL (59) 2150 356 1794
SARATOGA (60) 2150 356 1794
RANGER (61) 2150 356 1794
INDEPENDENCE (62) 2150 356 1794
KITTY HAWK (63) 2150 356 1794
CONSTELLATION (64) 2150 356 1794
ENTERPRISE (65) 2400 356 2044
AMERICA (66) 2400 356 2044
KENNEDY (67) 2400 356 2044
NIMITZ (68) 3000 356 2644
EISENHOWER (69) 3000 356 2644
VINSON (70) 3000 356 2644
XXXXXX (71) 3000 356 2644
Note. There is a 32 percent increase in officer billets and
a 72 percent increase in enlisted billets from the
Midway class to the Nimitz class of carriers. These
increases are due to the increase of aircraft on the
larger Nimitz class carriers
Source: Janes Fighting Ships 1980-1981 Edition , Franklin
Watts Inc., New York, N.Y.
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• Two fighter squadrons consisting of 24 F-4 Phantoms
or F-14 Tomcats (at this time the F-4 Phantoms are
being phased out and the F-14 Tomcat is the primary
fighter aircraft; its SQMD will be used in this thesis
for projected fighter squadron manpower requirements)
.
• Two light attack squadrons of 24 A- 7 Corsairs. The
A-7 Corsairs will start to be replaced by the F/A-18
Hornet in FY 83, but the replacement rate may increase
or decrease depending on the production of the new
aircraft and whether or not the Oriskany (CV-34) is
recommissioned. If the Oriskany (CV-34) is reccm-
missioned and Marine A- 4 Skyhawks are used on it, this
could step up introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet into
the Navy [Ref . 24] . Because of the uncertainty of the
plans and progress of the F/A-18 Hornet, all manpower
requirements will be projected from the A-7 Corsair
SQMD.... (See Table V for schedule of phase out of A-4's
and A- 7 ' s )
.
• One medium attack squadron of 12 A- 6 Intruders and 4
KA-6D tanker aircraft.
• One ASW squadron of 10 S-3 Scout aircraft.
• One ASW squadron of 6 SH-3 Sea King Helicopters for
plane guard/ASW.
• Smaller squadrons or detachments of 3 RF-8-reconnais-
sance aircraft. (At a later date, 2 F-14 Tomcats may
be configured as photo reconnaissance aircraft.) Four
EA-6B Prowler Electronic Warfare aircraft, and 4 E-2
Hawkeye Early-Warning/Control aircraft.
The Midway class carriers cannot accommodate the full airwing
as described above, and normally would not operate the RF-8's,
one-half of the SH-3's (as cargo helicopters and possibly for
plane guard), or any of the S-3's [Ref. 25].
Based on this composition of a typical carrier airwing
force, an examination will be made of the officer require-
ments for each of the above squadrons using SQMD's. A sample
officer SQMD can be seen in Table VI. (All other relevant
officer SQMD's are in Appendix A.) Tables VII through IX
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show the designator and grades for officers of various air-
wing compositions for a large carrier (Nimitz class) . Tables
X through XII show the designator and grades for officers of
various airwing compositions for a small carrier (Midway class)
TABLE V




F-4 USN 2 2
A- 7 USN 2 4 2 4
F-4 USMC 2 1 2 2 1
A- 4 USMC 1 1 1
Total
Source: NTP A-50-7703, Chief of Naval Operations
OP-112D32.
The information in Tables VIII and XI was utilized in the
construction of Table XIII. Table XIII shows the total air-
wing manpower requirements over the next decade. This is
done in two ways. First, sections Al, A2, A3 of Table XIII
utilize the assumption of two small carriers being in service
until FY 88, when two added Nimitz class carriers presently
being proposed by the Navy would come into service. This,
of course, proposes that both carriers are funded by Congress
and are built at the same time. Second, sections Bl, B2 and
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B3 of Table XIII calculate manpower projections based on
large carriers only. Table XIII, sections Bl, B2 and B3
,
will give a larger number of officer personnel required, but
could be more accurate than the numbers in sections Al, A2
and A3 because the small carriers often leave their excess
airwing personnel in strategic points ashore in case the
carrier has need of them quickly or a change in roles is
dictated [Ref . 26] . Although they are not on the carriers
as part of the airwing, the remaining aircraft and personnel
are on a standby basis and could be counted.
TABLE VI
AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
A-6E/XA-6D OFFICER
10 A-6E/4KA-6D AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rank
Designator W2 01 02 03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 2 2
131X 14 5 2 21






TOTAL 2 1 28 12 5 2 50





LARGE CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF (l)A-6, (2)A-7 /




02 03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 12 12
131X 88 54 27 8 177
132X 74 30 14 118
1520 3 6 3 12







TOTAL 16 14 163 93 44 20 350




LARGE CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF
CDA-6, (2)A-7, (l)E-2, (l)EA-6, (2)F-14,
(l)S-3, (DSH-3 and (l)RF-8 SQUADRONS)
Designator W2 01 02
-Rank
03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 12 12
131X 90 52 27 8 177
132X 74 30 14 118
1520 5 4 5 14







TOTAL 16 18 165 91 46 20 356




LARGE CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF
(l)A-6, (l)E-2, (l)EA-6, (2)F-14, (l)S-3,
(2)F/A-18, (l)SH-3 and (l)RF-8 SQUADRONS)
Designator W2 01 02
-Rank
03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 12 12
131X 92 46 27 8 173
132X 74 31 14 119
1520 5 4 5 14







TOTAL 14 18 167 86 46 20 351




SMALL CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF (l)A-6, (2)A-7,
(l)E-2, (l)EA-6, (2)F-4 and (l)SH-3 SQUADRONS)
Designator W2 01 02
-Rank
03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 10 10
131X 62 38 19 5 124
132X 58 21 11 90
1520 3 6 1 10






TOTAL 13 11 121 67 31 15 258




SMALL CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF (l)A-6, (2)A-7,
(l)E-2, (l)EA-6, (2JF-14, (l)SH-3 SQUADRONS)
Designator W2 01 02
--Rank
—
03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 10 10
131X 64 36 19 5 124
132X 58 21 11 90
1520 5 4 3 12







TOTAL 13 15 123 65 33 15 264




SMALL CARRIER AIRWING OFFICER PERSONNEL
(AIRWING CONSISTING OF (l)A-6, (l)EA-6,
(l)E-2, (2)F-14, (2)F/A-18, (l)SH-3 SQUADRONS)
Designator W2 01 02
—Rank--
03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 10 10
131X 66 33 19 5 123
132X 58 21 11 90
1520 5 4 3 12







TOTAL 11 15 125 62 33 15 261
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Section B3 of Table XIII was chosen to represent pro-
jected officer manpower requirements in this thesis because
of the following assumptions. The typical airwing composition
will be that of the large carrier airwing. This is so because
it seems obvious, in the light of the Navy's insistence on
continuing to commission Nimitz class carriers that the larger
airwings are the realistic projection for the next ten years,
besides being the "worst case" airwing manpower situation.
In addition to these factors, it has been previously shown
that smaller carriers, although carrying fewer aircraft on
board, still maintain the approximate airwing size of the
large carriers by leaving part of their assigned force ashore.
Table XIV reproduces Table XIII, Section B3, but gives
total number of billets plus a 30 percent increase for sea
and shore billets. These sea and shore billets are for avia-
tion personnel required to man positions other than airwing
billets [Ref. 27]. Air Department personnel for carriers,
flight instructors, recruiters and project managers are a
few examples of aviation billets that are included in the 3
percent factor. It is assumed in this thesis that the 3 per-
cent factor will be valid through 1990.
Table XV shows a sample of the enlisted manpower require-
ments from the same composite airwing as that used for officers.
(See Appendix B for all other enlisted SQMD ' s
.
) This informa-
tion was taken from the respective SQMD's, Table XV and all




TOTAL AIRWING OFFICER FORCE FOR FIFTEEN LARGE CARRIERS
C30 PERCENT FACTOR ADDED) a
Designator W2 01 02
—Rank-
OS 04 05 TOTAL
130X 234 234
131X 1755 1014 537 156 3462
132X 1443 585 273 2301
1520 111 88 105 304







TOTAL 344 382 3220 1795 915 390 7046
Note: a. Standard factor for shore and sea billets other
than those billets required for squadron manning




AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
A-6E/KA-6D ENLISTED
10 A-6E/4 KA-6D AIRCRAFT SQUADRON3
Paygrade
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
AD 7 96521 30
AE 4 89311 26
AF 11
AK 2 1 3 1 7
AM 11
AME 2 2 4 2 10
AMH 2 3 4 3 12
AMS 77342 23
AN 56 56
AO 8 7 5 4 1 25
APO 2 1 14
AQ 4 9 11 3 1 1 29
AT 4 7 9 3 1 24
AZ 2 2 2 1 7
DK 1 1
HM 1 1
IS 1 1 2
MS 3 1 2 6
NC 1 1
PN 1 1 1 1 4
PO 1 2 3
PR 1 2 1 1 5
SN 2 2
YN 2 2 1 1 6
TOTAL 108 63 68 33 7 5 2 286
Note: a. This squadron would have 10 attack aircraft (A-6's)
and 4 tankers (KA-6D inflight refueling aircraft)
.
Source: OPNAVINST 5320. 298A, Chief of Naval Operations OP-111C2
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force will show this force broken down by paygrade and
rating. Table XVI shows the enlisted force for a small
carrier, and Table XVII shows this breakdown for a large
carrier, even though only the large carrier manpower will
be used in the following tables. Tables XVIII and XIX are
constructed to be congruent with the officer data in Table
XIII, Section B3, and Table XIV. Tables XIV and XIX will




SMALL CARRIER AIRWING ENLISTED PERSONNEL CONSISTING OF
(l)A-6, (2)A-7, CDE-2, (DEA-6B, (2)F-14 and (l)SH-3
SQUADRONS
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5
•-Paygr
E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ABH 1 1
AD 27 44 36 32 8 9 156
AE 29 44 13 7 6 99
AF 3 3
AK 11 5 22 6 44
AME 14 18 17 14 2 4 69
AMH 23 26 24 18 5 96
AMS 41 39 33 24 9 3 149
AN 313 313
AO 41 35 31 18 5 130
APO 17 8 25
AQ 20 33 41 11 5 5 115
AT 33 69 74 17 10 8 211
AV 5 5
AZ 11 15 15 6 47
DK 8 8
HM 2 6 8
ZM 1 1
IS 1 1 2
MS 18 5 15 38
NC 1 4 5
OS 2 2
PN 5 8 8 8 29
PO 5 16 1 22
PR 8 10 10 3 31
SN 13 1 14
YN 6 18 10 5 2 41
TOTAL 614 379 398 184 48 29 12 1664




LARGE CARRIER AIRWING ENLISTED PERSONNEL CONSISTING OF
(UA-6, (2)A-7, (l)E-2, (1)EA-6B, (2)F-14, (l)S-3,
(l)SH-3 and (l)RF-8 SQUADRONS
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5
—Paygrade
—
E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ABH 1 1
AD 36 58 44 39 11 11 199
AE 41 55 54 19 8 8 185
AF 4 4
AK 13 7 30 7 57
AM 2 2
AME 18 23 21 17 2 4 85
AMH 26 32 29 21 6 114
AMS 52 51 41 32 10 4 190
AN 410 410
AO 48 38 34 32 8 160
APO 22 11 2 35
AQ 20 33 41 11 5 5 115
AT 51 89 94 22 13 9 278
AV 6 6
AW 13 11 12 4 3 43
AX 6 9 5 4 1 1 26
AZ 14 20 20 8 62
DK 10 10
HM 2 8 10
IM 2 2
IS 1 1 2
MS 21 7 20 48
NC 1 4 5
OS 2 2
PN 7 10 10 9 , 36
PO 5 21 2 28
PR 14 12 13 4 43
SN 17 1 18
YN 11 22 11 7 2 53
TOTAL 819 488 542 255 65 44 16 2229





TOTAL AIRWING ENLISTED FORCE FOR FIFTEEN LARGE CARRIERS
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6
f yi. aue"
E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ABH 15 15
AD 540 870 660 585 165 165 2985
AE 615 825 810 285 120 120 2775
AF 60 60
AK 195 105 450 105 855
AM 30 30
AME 270 345 315 255 30 60 1275
AMH 390 480 435 315 90 1710
AMS 780 765 615 480 150 60 2850
AN 6150 6150
AO 720 570 510 480 120 2400
APO 330 165 30 525
AQ 300 495 615 165 75 75 1725
AT 765 1335 1410 330 195 135 4170
AV 90 90
AW 195 165 180 60 45 645
AX 90 135 75 60 15 15 390
AZ 210 300 300 120 930
DK 150 150
HiM 30 120 150
IM 30 30
IS 15 15 30
MS 315 105 300 720
NC 15 60 75
OS 30 30
PN 105 150 150 135
•
540
PO 75 315 30 420
PR 210 180 195 60 645
SN 255 15 270
YN 165 330 165 105 30 795
TOTAL 12285 7320 8115 3750 1065 660 240 33435
Source
:




TOTAL AIRWING ENLISTED FORCE FOR FIFTEEN LARGE CARRIERS
30 PERCENT FACTOR ADDED a
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ABH 20 20
AD 702 1131 858 761 215 215 3882
AE 800 1073 1053 1141 156 156 4379
AF 78 78
AK 254 137 585 137 1113
AM 39 39
AME 351 449 410 332 39 78 1659
AMH 507 624 566 410 117 2224
AMS 1014 1095 800 624 195 78 3806
AN 7995 7995
AO 936 741 663 624 156 3120
APO 429 215 39 683
AQ 390 644 800 215 98 98 2245
AT 895 1736 1833 429 254 176 5323
AV 117 117
AW 254 215 234 78 59 840
AX 117 176 98 78 20 20 509
AZ 273 390 390 156 1209
DK 195 195
HM 39 156 195
IM 39 39
IS 20 20 40
MS 410 137 410 957
NC 20 78 98
OS 39 39
PN 137 195 195 176 703
PO 98 410 39 547
PR 273 234 254 78 839
SN 332 20 352
YN 215 429 215 137 39 1035
TOTAL 15875 9622 10574 5650 1387 860 312 44280
Note: a. Standard fac tor fo]: shore and S(=a bil lets c)ther
than those billets required for squadron manning.
Source: Compiled from Table XVIII.
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III. ATTRITION AND RETENTION
A problem of manpower shortages faces today's Navy,
particularly among middle grade officers (Lieutenant (LT)
and Lieutenant Commanders (LCDR) ) , and among the experienced
petty officers grades (E-5 through E-9) [Ref . 28] . At the
present time, the Navy has about 35 percent fewer pilots
than it needs and is short approximately 21,000 experienced
petty officers [Ref. 29] . Art Buchwald, a satirist, wrote a
column titled "Anchors Aweigh," which stated the following:
The United States is giving in to a crash program
to build up its military might. We want to be in a
position to match the Soviets on land, on sea and in
the air. There is only one problem. Once we get all
the new helicopters, planes and ships built, where do
we find the people to man them?
The Navy, for example, does not have enough crewmen
to handle the ships they're supposed to keep on the high
seas now. [Ref. 30]
Time magazine published an article "Who'll Fight for America?"
From this article the following examples are quoted:
For all of its sophisticated weaponry, America is
facing a shortage of the most valuable military resource
of all: Manpower.
Today, however, a career in the armed forces is not
attracting enough talented Americans. The Pentagon is
handicapped by shortages of sufficiently skilled and
disciplined personnel in all ranks.
And Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman David C. Jones
admits that "Our No. 1 readiness problem is people, the
availability of trained people." [Ref. 31]
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An article which relates more closely to the manpower problem
which this thesis addresses was written by syndicated columnist
Jack Anderson:
Two 90,000 ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are
proposed in the president's budget, and the twelve-carrier
fleet is to be expanded eventually to fifteen.
But the trouble is, the Navy is finding it tough to
hang onto enough pilots to man its present carrier strength
much less those who'll be needed to fly the planes from an
increased flattop fleet.
Last year, 436 Navy pilots quit. The Navy wound up
twenty-five percent short in pilots of commander rank and
below--the ones who would be most tempted by commercial
airline jobs. The Navy needed almost 13,000 pilots; it
had only 9,000, and this of course is before any new
carriers are built. [Ref. 32]
As can be seen from the above articles, the Navy is per-
ceived as having a manpower problem, both with its aviation
officers and with its enlisted personnel, particularly those
in the middle grades and ranks.
There is some expectation that the aviation-officer man-
power problem will not get better for some time to come. The
demand from the airlines for aviators for the next six to
eight years has been estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,200
pilots a year. A primary reason for this large number of
pilot vacancies is that the WW II era pilots who have held
positions with the airlines are now at retirement age. Also,
there is an expected growth of the airlines to accommodate
approximately 8 60 new pilots, bringing this total demand for
pilots by the airlines to about 1,900 per year through the
middle to late 1980's [Ref. 33]. When this 1,900 per year
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pilot need for commercial airlines is compared to the expected
growth in the pilot requirements for the Navy, one can expect
that the Navy's pilot shortage may continue, if not in fact
increase. At the present time, the combined Navy and Air
Force pilot training rate is only 2,075 per year [Ref. 34].
Currently, approximately 8 percent of the pilots hired by
the airlines were previously military pilots [Ref. 35] . This
does not take into consideration the growth or requirements
for pilots in general aviation which cause the 1,900 number
to increase. Of the 1,520 pilots (80 percent of the total
1,900 airline hirings projected yearly), the Air Force sup-
plies one-half and the Navy supplies the other half. In other
words, the Navy supplies, or will most likely supply, approx-
imately 760 pilots per year to the airlines [Ref. 36]. From
these facts, it can be seen that the military will have a
difficult time meeting its requirements for pilots.
These figures are of course subject to change in the future
as unforeseen developments take place. The recent Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) action, which has
caused a number of pilot layoffs, is a prime example of how
the projected picture can be altered. Nevertheless, despite
the temporary ebb and flow in demand, overall projections
still call for increased hiring by civil aviation.
A. AVIATION OFFICER RETENTION
The Navy's aviation officer community consists of two
distinct groups: the pilot (1310/5 designator), and the Naval
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Flight Officer (NFO) (.1320/5 designator). The pilot's role
is self-explanatory. But the NFO, on the other hand, per-
forms a variety of jobs. The NFO may be a navigator, weapons
system operator, electronic-counter-measures operator, or
fill any other job requiring an officer that does not involve
piloting of the aircraft, but does involve flying in an
aircraft.
Pilots and NFO's also face different demand curves in the
outside job market. The military pilot sees, during many
periods, a high demand by the commercial airlines. An NFO,
since he does not handle the airplane itself, but instead
handles the electronic equipment, does not have this demand
for his services. Because of the demand difference, there
is a difference between pilot and NFO retention rates, i.e.,
the NFO has a higher retention rate than does the pilot.
Figure 5 shows that the pilots leave the service at a much
greater rate than do the NFO's [Ref. 37]. The NFO's higher
retention rate has helped the Navy to some extent, in that
the NFO has been used to fill jobs formerly given to pilots.
Another problem tied to low retention is that pilots are
needed to train pilots and NFO's. Therefore, if pilots are
taken away from sea-going squadrons to fill training billets,
this increases the shortage of pilots at sea. Also, placing
pilots in training roles may decrease retention because pilots
don't want to be assigned to flight-instructor billets, since
flight- instructor billets are perceived to be of a lower
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B. AVIATION OFFICER ATTRITION
It is not possible to determine the feasibility of manning
the aviation wings of the fifteen carrier force without con-
sidering all of the factors which influence the final numbers
of personnel required. It must therefore be recognized that
retention is only a part of the problem. An equally important
factor is the attrition rate which acts to determine the total
number of personnel who must be attracted to a given desig-
nator in order to realize the required numbers of personnel
(all billets filled)
.
Table XX shows the programmed and actual training produc-
tion of Navy pilots from FY 7 5 to FY 80, and Table XXI shows
this information for NFO's. When the totals of Table XX are
compared with the 760 pilots per year the Navy has supplied
to the airlines , one can see that the Navy is producing a few
more pilots than the airlines projected they would hire prior
to the PATCO action in mid-1981.
Tables XX and XXI show the number who made it through
training compared to the number the Navy wanted. The figures
in these tables (XX and XXI) show the difference between
requirements met and actual numbers needed. (Where the goal
of 100 percent was met, the estimated aviation student attri-
tion rate was correct, but, where the percentage was below
100, the Navy's attrition of aviation students was higher
than expected. Conversely, if the percentage is above 100,





CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING PRODUCTION OF PILOTS
FOR FY 7 5 - FY 8
Programmed/Actual
and Percentage
JET PROP HELO TOTAL
FY 75 319/332 427/415 230/177 976/924
104% 97% 77% 95%
FY 76 340/324 375/375 205/205 920/904
98% 100% 100% 98%
FY 77TQa 87/81 83/81 55/55 225/217
93% 98% 100% 96%
FY 77 372/346 340/325 188/144 900/744
93% 75% 77% 83%
FY 78 335/276 270/182 195/139 800/597
82% 67% 71% 75%
FY 79 375/208 295/208 215/116 885/532
56% 71% 54% 60%
FY 80 318/320 316/320 251/251 885/891
101% 101% 100% 101%
Note: a. TQ is July 1 through September 30.





CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING PRODUCTION OF NFO'S
FOR FY 7 5 - FY 8
Programmed/Actual
and Percentage
YEAR TJN RIO ATDS NAV TOTAL
FY 75 52/44 85/74 43/21 172/172 361/322
85% 88% 49% 100% 89%
FY 76 169/150 79/59 22/23 190/190 460/422
88% 74% 104% 100% 91%
FY 77TQ e 43/43 10/10 12/16 50/50 115/119
100% 100% 133% 100% 103%
FY 77 142/142 74/74 40/40 184/186 440/442
100% 100% 100% 101% 101%
FY 78 142/133 98/90 30/30 190/172 460/425
95% 92% 100% 91% 92%
FY 79 130/121 78/72 37/37 205/179 450/409
93% 92% 100% 87% 91%
FY 80 130/130 74/74 41/41 205/206 450/451
100% 100% 100% 101% 101%
Notes
:
a. Tactical Jet Navigator, A
b. Radar Intercept Officer,
c. Airborne Tactical Data Sy
aircraft.
d. Navigator, P-3, aircraft.
e. TQ is July 1 through Sept
-6's,S-3's aircraft.
F-4's,F-14's aircraft,
stems, EA-6's & E2-C
ember 30, 1977.




Those who did not complete training and either left the
service or selected another designator (not aviation) are
not included in these figures. Figure 6 shows attrition
rates during training for pilots, and Figure 7 shows the
rates for NFO's. Taking the average attrition rates over
the years (shown in Figures 6 and 7), one finds a 28 percent
attrition rate for pilots and a 29 percent attrition rate for
NFO's. If the 28 percent attrition rate from pilot training
is subtracted from 100 percent entering training, the result-
ant figure, when multiplied by the 30 percent pilot retention
figure for FY 80, indicates that the Navy would need approxi-
mately five college graduates starting flight training in
order to ultimately fill every junior officer billet required
up to the LCDR (04) level. And this would only keep the pilot
force (up to LCDR) at today's strength, which is 25 to 35
percent below what is required [Ref . 39] . Performing the
same computations for NFO's shows that the Navy would only
need two college graduates for every NFO billet (up to LCDR)
requirement. These calculations do not take into account
deaths or those officers who are passed over twice and are
forced to leave the service, but it does include those few
officers who choose to leave after the ten-year point.
(Because the number of officers who leave the Navy after the
ten-year point is so small, the full 3 percent attrition
rate was assigned to the first opportunity period.)
Table XXII shows historical promotion results for pilots
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increased as the retention rates have decreased. Because
the promotion rates are not at 100 percent, we can assume
some pilots and NFO's leave the service because they have
failed to be selected to the next higher rank. It cannot be
determined from this table (Table XXII) what percentage of
pilots and NFO's left the Navy after being passed over for
promotion, so attrition rates will only be calculated for
the training-attrition data.
TABLE XXII
LIEUTENANT TO LIEUTENANT COMMANDER PROMOTION RATES









Notes: a. 1310 Designator for pilots.
b. 1320 Designator for NFO's.
c. Selection percentages are defined as the total
number of selectees above, below and in zone
divided by the number of officers eligible in the
zone. A percentage of greater than 100% is
obtained when the number of all selectees is
greater than the number of in zone eligibles.
Source: Officer Promotion Opportunity within the Navy Unre-
stricted Line 1973-1979
, Hansell, R.C., Naval Post-












Later in this thesis the aviation personnel attrition
and retention data will be coupled with other data for use
in a requirements vs. inventory model.
C. ENLISTED ATTRITION AND RETENTION
This section will deal with eleven categories of enlisted
personnel working in Naval aviation. There are more than
eleven categories for enlisted ratings within the Navy, but
we are only concerned with those that have a direct impact
on the aviation side of the Navy. The personnel in the fol-
lowing ratings deal primarily with aircraft, and specifically
the maintenance of aircraft: PR, AD, AE, AME, AMH, AMS, A0#
AQ, AT, AW and AX (see Appendix C for explanation of ratings)
.
There are other ratings that have an A prefix, but they are
only involved in paper work, work at shore based installations
only, or are not assigned to a squadron, i.e., AB, ABE, ABF,
AG, AS, ASE, ASH, and AVS personnel are not assigned to a
squadron. AZ and AK personnel are assigned to squadrons, but
they do not perform maintenance on aircraft. The PR rating,
even though not prefixed with an A, is assigned to squadrons
and does work on equipment for the aircraft as well as on the
survival equipment for the aviators. The PR rating is there-
fore included in this study.
The enlisted ratings chosen are all on the Career Reen-
listment Objectives (CREO) list in Table XXIII [Ref. 40].
Table XXIII shows that the aviation ratings are in demand











E6 E7 E8 E9
AQ A ob A A B C B _c
AE B B B C C A -
AT B A B C c B -
AW B A B B c C C
AD C C B C c C -
AME C idcl C C C c - -
AMH C D B C D - -
AMS C D B C D - -
AO C C C C C c B
AX C C C C D B -
PR C cl C C C C C A
Notes: a. See Appendix C for explanation of ratings.
b. means that there are no requirements at this
level.
c. No requirements at this paygrade.
d. These ratings closed for reenlistment at this
paygrade level.
An A means that there is a high demand for personnel
in a rating and a D means that the demand is less.




a rating on the CREO list has a very good opportunity to
reenlist, should he so desire. Also, variable reenlistment
bonuses are tied to the CREO list. (The alphabetical code A
means there is a strong need for people to reenlist in that
rating and D means there is a lesser need. If the code (cl)
appears, it indicates that a particular rating area is filled,
and no individual of that rating (usually tied to a specific
paygrade) can reenlist in that rating. If the person wants
to reenlist he would have to change ratings.) One can also
ascertain from Table XXIII that there is a larger need of
ratings in the E-4 through the E-6 paygrades, i.e., the middle
paygrades
.
One of the recent theses completed at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School addressed attrition severity [Ref . 41] . In that
thesis, data were gathered to show shortages or excesses of
personnel in U.S. Navy ratings. Data for those ratings that
are relevant to aviation are shown in Table XXIV. As one can
see, there seems to be an overage in almost all ratings except
AO's, the billets of which were filled to the exact amount
required. Table XXIV takes into account paygrades E-3 through
E-9. (The Navy has no formal billet requirements for E-l and
E-2 paygrades. These requirements are usually covered and
encompassed by the E-3 paygrade.) Thus, the picture created
by Table XXIV gives the impression that the Navy does not
have an enlisted aviation manpower problem. This may be true




SIZE AND SHORTAGE OR EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS



































Notes: a. See Appendix C for rating names.
b. Size equals inventory.
c. Shortage or excess equals (requirements minus
inventory) divided by requirements.
Source: Fourth Quarter FY 80 Navy Military Personnel Statistics
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can be seen that there is an overage in the E-l to E-3 pay-
grades, while paygrades E-4 through E-9 have a shortage, and
there are large shortages in the E-5 and E-9 paygrades. So,
by noting the shortages of the middle-grade enlisted pay-
grades shown in Table XXV, one can determine that the Navy
does, in fact, have an enlisted aviation manpower problem.
TABLE XXV











Note: a. E1-E3 has an overage, all others are shortages.
Source: These data were gathered from various sources and
were presented in a manpower class, MN 410 6 MPT
Policy Analysis, in June 1981. The course addressed
the question of how to man a 600-ship Navy.
Current Shortages
Requirement Number Percentage









Attrition of first-term Navy enlisted personnel has
increased substantially from rates observed in the mid-1960' s.
In 1966, total premature loss after two years was 10 percent
of accessions. That number had risen to 29 percent by 1976.
Losses by the fourth year of enlistment increased from 17
percent in 1966 to 41 percent by 1976. [Ref. 42]
Table XXVI shows the reenlistment opportunity (at entry)
for grouped aviation ratings in 1979 [Ref. 43] . Even though
the Navy only attrites approximately 24 to 27 percent of its
enlisted aviation force in four years of service (as shown
in Table XXVI) , the chances of reenlisting an individual are
small.
Table XXVII shows the reenlistment rates for all ratings.
In comparing Tables XXVI and XXVII, it can be seen that the
Navy has more problems in retaining aviation personnel at the
first reenlistment opportunity than it does in retaining
personnel in most other ratings that do not involve aviation.
Table XXVIII shows attrition and retention rates Navy-
wide. These data were gathered for a project at the Naval
Postgraduate School in which the billet requirements for a
600-ship Navy were forecasted.
The last table (Table XXIX) of this section was derived
from the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC-DSS) , Navy
Military Personnel Statistics [Ref. 44]. Table XXIX includes
attrition and retention percentages for all aviation ratings




NAVY FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT CHANCES (AT ENTRY)
BY RATING/GROUP (IN PERCENTAGE)
Four Year Reenlistment Retention
AVWEPa Survival Chance Chance if Survived Chance at Entry
AT,AW,AQ, ?6 16 12
AC, AX
Four Year Reenlistment Retention
AVMa Survival Chance Chance if Survived Chance at Entry
AM, AD, 73 22 lgAE,AO
Note: a. AVWEP and AVM are names for composite groups of
ratings.
Source: First Term Survival and Reenlistment Chances for Navy
Ratings and a Strategy for Their Use . Thomason,
James S., Center for Naval Analyses (CRC 382), May
1979.
TABLE XXVII
FIRST TERM NAVY ENLISTED RETENTION RATES,
FY 71 TO FY 7 9
ACTUAL ESTIMATED PROJECTED
FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 FY 79
28 32 34 38 32 35 38 31 28
Source: American Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer
Armed Forces
, Office of the Assistant Secretary of






NAVY ATTRITION AND RETENTION STATISTICS,
FY 81 (TO JUNE 1981)
1st Term Attrition 26 percent
1st Term Retention 31 percent
2nd Term Retention 55 percent
3rd Term Retention 64 percent
Source: These data were gathered from various sources and
were presented in a manpower class, MN 4106 MPT
Policy Analysis, in June 1981. The course addressed
the question of how to man a 6 00- ship Navy.
of service, i.e., length of service time from E-l to E-2 will
be assumed to be six months; from E-2 to E-3, six months;
time from E-3 to E-4 will be assumed to be one year (but
could be as little as nine months); E-4 to E-5, one year; E-5
to E-6, three years; and three years from E-6 to E-7, E-7 to
E-8, and E-8 to E-9. These are the minimum times for an in-
dividual to be eligible for promotion to the next higher grade
The data set forth in this chapter have addressed three
areas (attrition, retention, and promotion) affecting ultimate
numbers of personnel available, both officer and enlisted, in
the Naval aviation community. The data will be the basis for
the transition matrix to be used in a Markov Chain model in
Chapter IV of this thesis. The model will be used to estab-
lish projections of numbers of personnel required to fill




ENLISTED CONTINUATION RATES FOR NAVY
AVIATION ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Year of
Service AD AE AME AMH AMS AO
1. .9478 .9998 .9998 .9287 .9341 .9746
2. .7969 .9133 .9293 .8250 .8285 .8187
3. .6402 .7523 .8091 .6567 .6489 .6401
4. .2870 .3567 .3733 .3403 .3228 .3097
5. .2674 .3373 .3515 .3190 .2992 .3018
6. .2418 .2973 .3206 .2916 .2690 .2565
7. .2285 .2722 .2942 .2723 .2525 .2405
8. .2094 .2352 .2543 .2439 .2321 .2194
9. .1933 .2120 .2115 .2199 .2075 .2031





1. .9998 .9998 .9998 .9998 .9998
2. .9250 .9174 .9212 .9573 .9137
3. .8163 .7852 .7707 .8076 .7937
4. .5611 .5380 .3795 .5296 .4044
5. .5306 .5170 .3732 .5287 .3969
6. .3745 .3958 .3207 .4594 .3666
7. .3236 .3649 .2897 .4407 .3401
8. .2554 .3066 .2432 .4049 .3158
9. .1782 .2537 .2185 .3756 .3121
10. .1333 .2241 .2185 .3571 .2691
Note: The data go up to thirty years of service, but only
ten years of data are needed for calculations in
Chapter IV.
Source: Naval Military Personnel Commands (NMPS-DSS) , Navy
Military Personnel Statistics , dated 17 March 1981
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IV. MANPOWER PROJECTIONS (MARKOV CHAIN MODEL MANMOD)
In this chapter a program named MANMOD, which is based
on a Markov Chain model, will be used to predict officer and
enlisted manpower accession and retention requirements for a
fifteen carrier force. These predictions will be based on
rank for the two aviation officer designators and on pay-
grade for the eleven enlisted aviation ratings used. The
period of time covered will be from present day to FY 1990.
To understand this section, a simple explanation of a
Markov Chain model is in order. The first assumption of a
Markov Chain model is that an individual will move from one
time period to the next independently of other individuals,
and with identical probabilities which do not vary over time
[Ref . 45] . Secondly, each person has a given probability of
making any particular transition [Ref. 4 6]. These probabil-




p p p p w
*21 22 23 2k 2
Pkl Pk2 Pk3 Pkk Wk
where the element P.
. is the probability that an individual
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in grade at the beginning of an interval of time will move
to grade j at the end of that time interval, while W. is the
probability that an individual of grade i at the start has
left the Navy by the end of the interval. Another assumption
is that each person must stay where he is, move to another
grade, or leave [Ref . 47] . The row sums for each row must
equal one, i.e.,
p + p +P .. ...+P
^11 12 13 Ik
The matrix P = )p. .) is the transition matrix and the column
vector W = (w. , w ? , w_, w, ) is known as the wastage vec-
tor [Ref. 48] . It is implicit in this model that time is
discrete. In practice, the unit of time will be a year or a
month. (In this thesis all periods are yearly.) All the P
and W elements will be assigned numerical values using esti-
mates of probabilities from past data. To use this model,
one also needs information on the initial stock vector (N = n
,
n2 ,
n«,...n,). At any time an individual can be classified
into a group on the basis of whatever attributes are relevant.
Finally, a recruitment vector (R = r,, r
2 ,
r ,...r,) is used
to replenish the stocks (N) [Ref. 49].
This model, Markov Chain (MANMOD) , was chosen because
manpower systems are regarded as a set of interconnected
stocks and flows and the common empirical observations are
that flows are proportional to stocks [Ref. 50]
.
Unfortunately, data for the P matrix come in different
forms, and various computations have to be made before the
75

information can be utilized. For the officer data, the
information was fairly straightforward. The attrition data
given in Figures 6 and 7 need only conform to P + W = 1,
where the attrition rates equal the wastage rates. The
officer retention rates from Figure 5 are already in the
W - 1 form, i.e., the wastage rate has been taken into account




P = 1 - W =-r±
G
i
where G. is the probability that an individual will survive
from one year to the next. These data for enlisted are shown
in Table XXIX of the previous chapter. The reason G. is
divided into (G. +1) is that G. + 1 will have a compound
wastage rate.
If the data were applied directly to the P matrix, the
wastage rate from row 1 would also be contained in row 2 and
the wastage rate in row 3 would contain the wastage rates of
rows 1 and 2, etc. This would compound the wastage rates and
give a false picture of the P matrix, thereby showing a
greater loss of personnel than there really would be.
A. OFFICER MANMOD MODEL
The first manpower projection made with the MANMCD model
was for the NFO's (1320/5 designators). This projection
covered a ten-year span. The ten-year time span was chosen
for two reasons. First, the carrier force is planned to
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increase over this time; and second, the average length of
time spent by officers in the ranks Ensign (ENS) to LCDR is
nine years of service. The breakdowns for the year groups
are as follows: ENS (01) first and second years of service,
LTJG (02) third and fourth year, LT (03) fifth to end of ninth
year, and the tenth year for LCDR (04).
To calculate the stock vector (the N stock vector is the
amount of the initial stocks of the individual groups in the
study), Table XIII, section Bl, and Table XXI (FY 80 data)
were used. The data from Table XXI were used because this
would give the most current look at NFO production and, hope-
fully, reflect the upcoming years. Data selected from Table
XXI (FY 8 0) included TJN's, RIO's, ATD's, and only 5 percent
of the NAV (Navigator on an aircraft, usually a patrol type
aircraft) . This figure, 5 percent of the NAV, was chosen
because the majority of these individuals serve on Patrol
aircraft and are not involved in shipboard squadrons. It was
felt that 5 percent would cover the E2C aircraft (the only
propellor squadron assigned to a large carrier) NFO needs.
Taking these figures and applying the average attrition
rate of 29 percent for student NFO's (from Figure 7), one
would end up with a stock of 879 NFO's for the Ensign (01)
time span. The average attrition rate for the past twenty
years (29 percent) was used in order to provide an overall
estimate of NFO students.
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Stock vectors for the 02 (LTJG) , 03 (LT) and 04 (LCDR)
come directly from Table XIII, section Bl. It is assumed,
then, that all current airwing billets are filled. The 02
and 03 grades are spaced out over two and five year time
periods respectively. Since the officer structure is pyram-
idical, the junior years in each grade were given a larger
proportion of the stock. This apportionment of the N (stock
vectors) can be seen in the computer run example shown in
Table XXX. The same assumptions for apportionment were used
for the pilot (1310/5 designators) predictions utilizing
Table XIII, section Bl, for the 02 to 04 groups, and Table XX
for the 01 's. (Here, too, personnel stocks are derived by
assuming all billets are filled.)
Table XX stocks were calculated by using the percentage
of the pilot figures which applied to JET aircraft and 10
percent of the figures which applied to PROP and HELO pilots.
(These figures were percentages of the actual production of
pilot numbers.) The reason for using only 10 percent of the
PROP and HELO was that the same assumptions as were made when
calculating the numbers of NFO's needed for propellor aircraft
were applied, with the exception that the E2C has two pilots.
The 10 percent for HELO's was added to the N (stock vector)
to cover the needs of the SH-3 squadrons aboard carriers.
Using these figures, and applying the 28 percent average
attrition rate (from Figure 6) for student pilots, gives a




EXAMPLE OF OFFICER MANMOD COMPUTER RUN
FOR LCDR ACCESSIONS
NOTES
ENTER N (INITIAL CLASS VALUES)
739 600 670 500 200 200 100 100










This is the initial stock
vector showing the number of
76 351a individuals who are already
ROWS. . in the Navy.
This is the P matrix where
the percentage rates are
derived from calculations
which include attrition,
retention and promotion in-
formation. A rate is needed
for each year studied, with
the last rate being all
zeroes because no more cal-













ENTER NUMBER OF RECRUIT TYPE
1 FIXED RECRUIT TYPE
2 ADDITIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
3 MULTIPLICATIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
4 ADDITIVE (SYSTEM SIZE)
5 MULTIPLICATIVE (SYSTEM SIZE)
Notes a, b - see page 83
.
This section is where the
programmer chooses the type
of recruitment policy to be
observed. In this thesis
recruitment type cne (1) was
chosen because in each run
accession was assumed to be










1 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL GRADE SIZE
2 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE OF
ORIGINAL GRADE SIZE
At this point the progranmer
could select the percentage
rate that will appear in
the percentage column in
the program runs. This
thesis used selection one
(1).
DO YOU WISH TO SEE INTERVENING YEARS
NO
1 YES
END OF INPUT PROGRAM
BASEQN 10d




2 600 I 17)
3 670 < 19)
4 500 ( 14)
5 200 1 ' 6)
6 200 1 ' 6)
7 100 1 : 3)
8 100 I
: 3)




TOTAL 3536 1 100) 2173
1 1 2173 I : 43)
2 591 1 12)
3 551
: id
4 670 ' 13)













TOTAL 5081 [144) 2173
At this section the program-
mer would be able to choose
whether all years of pro-
jection are to be shown or
just the last year. If a
zero is chosen, only the
zero year and the last year
selected will be displayed.
When a one (1) is selected,
all years, including the
zero year, will be shown.
.The T column shows the year
of the projection and the
N column shows the number
of individuals found at
each row for that year,
while the percent column
shows the percent of the
total N of individuals at
each level. The total
percentage is based not on
the sum of the percentage
column but instead on the
percent increase or decrease
of the zero N stocks. The
R column shows the number
of recruits for the period
shown.









3 543 (. 8)
4 551 ( 8)
5 657 (: io)
6 490 1
: 7)
7 200 1 2)
8 200 1
: 2)
9 65 1 i)
10 34 1 i)
TOTAL 6652 ( 188) 2173
3 1 2173 ( 27)
2 1738 I 21)
3 1598 ( 20)
4 543 ( 7)
5 540 ( 7)
6 657 I 8)
7 490 ( 6)
8 200 1 2)
9 130 1 2)
10 34 < o)
TOTAL 8104 1 229) 2173




3 1598 ; 17)















TOTAL 9525 [269) 2173





















TOTAL 10789 :305) 2173
This is the second year point
and the second row is now at
steady state. The following
projected years will have a
steady state at each associ-
ated row, i.e., at the fourth
year point the fourth row
will be at steady state.
Steady state will occur when
the input remains at a con-
stant level over time.
Therefore, each year will
bring its respective row to
a steady state condition
until the whole projection
is at a steady state and the
only way to change this state
is to change the recruitment
vector (accessions)
.
Three rows of steady states
have been achieved. This
third row for each of the
following projected years
will be in a steady state,
i.e., row 3 for each pro-
jected year will have the
same number. The other N
rows will continue to change
until they reach a steady
state. The changes are





6 1 2173 (: 18)
2 1738 ( ; is)
3 1598 1 : 13)
4 1598 ( 13)
5 1566 I: 13)
6 1566 ( 13)
7 532 | 4)
8 540 1 ' 5)




TOTAL 11905 337) 2173




3 1598 { 12)
4 1598 1 : 12)
5 1566 ( 12)
6 1566 1 : 12)
7 1566 { 12)
8 532 | : 4)
9 351 ! : 3)
10 225 < : 2)
TOTAL 12912 '365) 2173
8 1 2173 1 : i6)
2 1738 < : 13)







7 1566 1 id
8 1566 1
: id




TOTAL 13900 ;393i 2173





















Each of the following year
projections will behave in
the same manner as the pre-
ceding ones until the end
projection point is reached.
At this end point (10 years
in this thesis) all N rows
are in steady state. There
would be no further changes
in the N column if year 20
was requested. The N column
represents the amount of






10 1 2173 ( 15)
2 1738 ( 12)
3 1598 ( 11)
4 1598 C 11)
5 1566 ( 10)
6 1566 ( 10)
7 1566 ( 10)
8 1566 ( 10)
9 1018 ( 7)
10 537 ( 4)
„JJlTAL_ii924__J4J2X__2173
Notes:
a. Each value refers to the initial stock of individuals
for each year, i.e., 739 ENS in their first year of
service, 600 ENS in their second year of service, 670
LTJG's in their first year (third row of table), 500
LTJG's in their second year, 200 LT's in their first
year, etc.
b. The .8 shows that only 8 percent of the ENS go into the
next year point (20 percent lost by attrition) . The
.919 shows that only 91.9 percent of the ENS at this
year point go on to the next point (LTJG) . The other
rows also show what percentage goes on to their next
year points. If the percentage is less than 100 per-
cent, retention, attrition and promotion were taken
into account.
c. The recruitment vector number is only used at the first
year point because all recruitment is at the first year
point, and no lateral entries are included. If lateral
entries were to be included, then recruitment vector
numbers would be used at other year points.
d. BASEQN 10 shows that only a 10 year projection was asked
for; if a 20 year projection had been asked for, BASEQN
20 would be entered at this point.
e. Each row coincides with the N (initial class vector)
,
i.e., row 1 equals ENS at the first year point row
10 is equal to LCDR's.
Appendix D shows a step-by- step utilization of MANMOD as
the program exists in the Naval Postgraduate School's
computer.




were apportioned in a pyramidical fashion over each appropriate
segment.
Next, the P (transition matrix) was generated. For the
NFO's this matrix contained the wastage rate minus 1 (P = W-1),
and the retention rates derived from Figure 7 and Figure 5,
respectively. The attrition rate was divided between the
first and second year for the 01' s. This division was done
to cover both years, because the training cycle can take up
to two years before an individual is qualified to go on to a
squadron. The division of the 29 percent average attrition
rate for student NFO's was assessed higher for the first year,
at 20 percent, because the greatest loss of students is during
the initial training phase [Ref. 51]. The other 9 percent was
attached to the second year of the 01 cycle.
For the matrix rows containing the grade of 02 (row three
and row four) , it was assumed that all individuals who sur-
vived ENS (01) second year point would survive to the third
year point (first year as a LTJG (02)). Therefore, the value
of one (1) was assigned to the third row of the P matrix.
At the fourth year point (fourth row of the matrix) , the
retention rate was taken to be 98 percent. A 98 percent
rather than a 100 percent rate was chosen to cover any losses
that might have occurred from promotion failure to LT (03) or
change of designator for various reasons. The 2 percent wast-
age rate could also include death or health problems which




If an individual survived to the fourth year 03 point,
it was assumed he would have a 100 percent chance of reaching
the seventh year (seventh row of the P matrix) . The assump-
tion behind this was that once an individual made it to the
03 level, prior to finishing his aviation obligation, the
only losses would be through medical problems or death.
These two losses were considered to have insufficient impact
(at least in peacetime) on the P matrix to cause any signif-
icant changes.
The normal obligation for flight trained individuals is
six years for pilots, and four and one-half for the NFO ' s
.
This obligation is a payback period required from an indi-
vidual in return for the flight training he received. The
six year total obligation was allotted to both the pilots
and NFO's in this thesis, because the normal issue of orders
carries a clause that upon acceptance of the orders an obli-
gation is incurred. This obligation would bring the NFO's
up to the sixth year of aviation duty along with the pilots.
At the eighth and ninth year point (eighth and ninth row)
,
the P matrix uses the retention data from Figure 5. The
retention data were divided equally over the two years be-
cause even though the retention data cover all grades, the
majority of losses are at the end of the six-year obligation
point. This obligation usually places an individual at the
eighth or ninth row of the P matrix, depending on acceptance




For the ninth year (ninth row of the P matrix) , the
retention data from FY 8 were combined with the average
promotion data from Table XXII. The average promotion data
were selected because of the large differences in the per-
centage rates over the years shown. Also, it was felt that
the promotion rates will not remain as high as those of
FY 79 because the long-term effect of such a high rate would
be a change in the officer pyramid structure. The same
assumptions made for the NFO P matrix were used in making
the pilot P matrix.
Last to be described is the recruitment vector (R)
.
Since the military has a pyramidical structure, and brings
new individuals in at the bottom, only the first year in the
recruitment vector has recruits. In other words, there is
little or no lateral entry. This assumption of no lateral
entry was made for pilots also.
B. ENLISTED MANMOD MODEL
The enlisted N (stock vector) was calculated from Table
XVII in the same way as the officer N (stock vector) , with
the following exceptions. First, Table XVII 's stock was
multiplied by thirteen to give a present day stock. (Table
XVII shows only the enlisted personnel needs for one carrier
and since the initial stock of individuals would be for
thirteen carriers, the multiplication was required. This
multiplication had already been done for the officer data
given in Table XIII, section Bl.) Second, the apportionment
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of stocks over the year groups was more uniform (not as
pyramidical as for the officers) because the pyramid effect
is less prevalent for enlisted, as is shown by Table XXV.
Also, the first period covers E-l to E-3. Since there are
no billets assigned to the E-l's and E-2's, and it takes only
one year to make E-3, these paygrades (E-l, E-2 and E-3) were
lumped together. It is realized that in those three paygrades
individuals have different probabilities of promotion to E-4,
but for the model to be tractable, that assumption was made.
The second stock vector contained all E-4's. (E-4's can
be promoted to E-5 in nine months, but to keep the groups at
yearly intervals a one-year promotion time was assumed.)
Third, fourth and fifth rows of the P matrix contained the
E-5's. For the sixth, seventh and eighth rows of the P matrix,
E-6's were used, and E-7's were used for the ninth row. The
E-5 and E-6 paygrades have three-year slots because that is
the minimum time that an individual can remain in those pay-
grades before he can be promoted. It is assumed that all
individuals proceed to the next year. There are only nine
years in this section, because at the tenth year an individual
will still only be at the E-7 paygrade point.
The P matrix for the enlisted was calculated from Table
G. + 1
XXIX by applying the formula P = 1 - W =
—
^
— . This calcu-
i
lation takes into account wastage and promotion rates which
were applied directly to the P matrix. The R (recruitment
vector) is generated in the same fashion as that for officers.
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Table XXXI provides an example of the results obtained from
the MANMOD program for the eleven different enlisted ratings.
C. OFFICER AND ENLISTED SUPPLIES UNDER A PRESENT DAY
ACCESSION AND RETENTION SCENARIO
The first MANMOD computer runs were done to shew how
present day accession rates would affect the FY 1990 force
requirements if those rates were projected over the next ten
years. Table XXXII represents the officer and enlisted
supplies as compared to the billets required by the FY 1990'
s
fifteen carrier force. Both FY 80 and FY 81 accession data
were used in the computations. No figures appear in column
"FY 1990 Projections by FY 1981 Accessions" when the manpower
projections are unchanged from the previous column [Ref . 52]
.
It must also be noted that the figures shown as available
for the enlisted ratings/paygrades include all aviation
enlistees, and not just those available to the fleet airwings.
Therefore, enlisted figures from Table XXXII will be explained
more fully later in this chapter.
An examination of the figures shown in Table XXXII for
pilots shows clearly that the Navy will have a deficit of
seagoing pilot LCDR's (04' s) by FY 1990 if the accession,
retention, attrition and promotion rates continue at present
levels. Particularly interesting is the overage in pilot
LT's (03' s) which is predicted. With this in mind, it should
be remembered that the LT's (03 's) are spread over a five-




EXAMPLE OF ENLISTED MANMOD COMPUTER RUN
FOR AD (E-7) ACCESSIONS
NOTES
ENTER N( INITIAL CLASS VALUES)
468 754 192 190 190 169 169 169 143
a












This is the initial stock
vector showing the number
of individuals who are
already in the Navy.
. . This is the P matrix where




information. A rate is
needed for each year
studied, with the last
rate being all zeroes be-
cause no more calculations









ENTER NUMBER OF RECRUIT TYPE
1 FIXED RECRUIT VECTOR
2 ADDITIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
3 MULTIPLICATIVE (RECRUIT
4 ADDITIVE (SYSTEM SIZE)
5 MULTIPLICATIVE (RECRUIT
ENTER R (RECRUITMENT VECTOR)
1025 0000000 0°




This section is where
the programmer chooses the
type of recruitment policy
to be observed. In this
thesis recruitment type one
(1) was chosen because
accession was assumed to be








1 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL GRADE SIZE
2 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE
OF ORIGINAL GRADE SIZE
At this point the programmer
could select the percentage
rate that will appear in
the percentage column in
the program runs. This
thesis used section one (1)
.





END OF INPUT PROGRAM
BASEQN 10d
T N PERCENT Jt\ • • • i
o i e 468 { 19)
2 754 < 31)
3 192 ( 8)
4 190 ( 8)
5 190 \ 8) » • •
6 169 ( 7)
7 169 1 ' 7)
8 169 { 7)
9 143 1 : 6)
TOTAL 2444 ( 100) 1025
1 1 1025 1 : 34)
2 444 1 : is)







7 153 1 : 5)
8 160 1 5)
9 155 : 5)



















TOTAL 3478 [142] 1025
At this section the program-
mer would be able to choose
whether all years of projec-
tion are to be shown or just
the last year. If a zero
is chosen, only the zero
year and the last year
selected will be displayed.
When a one is selected, all
years, including the zero
year, will be shown.
The T column shows the year
of the projection and the N
column shows the number of
individuals found at each
row for that year. While
the percent column shows
the percent from the total
N of individuals at each
level. The total percentage
is based not on the sum of
the percentage column, but
instead on the percent in-
crease or decrease of the
zero N stocks. The R column
shows the number of recruits
for the period shown.
. This is the second year point
and the second row is now at
steady state. The following
projected years will have a
steady state at each associ-
ated level, i.e., at the
fourth year point the fourth











3 817 ( 22) :
4 300 ( 8) :
5 228 ( 6) :
6 64 ( 2) :
7 72 ( 2) :
8 151 ( 4)
9 132 ( 4)
TOTAL 3761 ( 154) 1025
4 1 1025 ( 25)
2 971 ( 24)
3 817 { 20)
4 656 ( 16)
5 134 < 3)




8 68 < : 2)
9 139 1 : 3)
TOTAL 4081 '167) 1025
5 1 1025 1
: 24)
2 971 I : 23)
3 817 1 : i9)
4 656 : i6)
5 294 : 7)
6 125 [ 3)
7 192 [ 5)
8 55 [ 1)
9 62 [ 1)
TOTAL 4199 [1722 1025
6 1 1025 ( 23)
2 971
; 22)
3 817 ( 19)
4 656 ( 15)
5 294 ( 7)
6 274 ( 6)
7 113 ( 3)
8 182 ( 4)
9 50 ( 1)
TOTAL 4383 [1792 1025
Steady state will occur when
the input remains at a con-
stant level over time.
Therefore, each year will
bring its respective level
to a steady state condition
until the whole projection
is at a steady state and the
only way to change this state
is to change the recruitment
vector (accessions)
.
Three rows of steady state
have been achieved. This
third row for each of the
following projected years
will be in a steady state,
i.e., row 3 for each projec-
tion year will have the same
number. The other N rows will
continue to change until they
reach a steady state. The





7 1 1025 ( 22)
2 971 ( 21)
3 817 ( 18)




6 274 ( 6)
7 248 ( 5)
8 107 ( 2)
9 167 { 4)
TOTAL 4559 ( 187) 1025
8 1 1025 ( 22)
2 971 I 21)
3 817 I 18)
4 656 { 14)
5 294 < : 6)
6 274 1
: 6)
7 248 1 : 5)
8 234 1
: 5)
9 98 1 [ 2)
TOTAL 4618 .189) 1025
9 1 1025 1 : 22)
2 971 1
: 2D
3 817 1 : 17)





7 248 1 : 5)
8 234 1 : 5)
9 215 : 5)
TOTAL 4735 ;i94) 1025
10 1 1025 : 22)
2 971 : 2i)
3 817 : 17)




7 248 ( 5)
8 234
: 5)
9 215 [ 5)
NOTES
Each of the following year
projections will behave in
the same manner as the pre-
ceding ones until the end
projection point is reached.
At this point (9 years in this
thesis) all N rows are in
steady state. There would be
no further changes in the N
column if year 20 was requested
The N column represents the
amount of individuals who can







a. Each value refers to the initial stocks of individuals
for each year segment, i.e., 468 E-l's to E-3's in the
first year, 754 E-4's in the second year of service,
192 E-5's in their first year, 190 E-5's in their
second year, 190 E-5's in their third year, etc.
b. The .9478 shows that only 94.78 percent of the E-l's
to E-3's go onto the next year point (5.22 percent loss
by attrition). The .8408 shows that only 84.08 percent
of the E-4's at this year point go onto E-5's. The
other rows also show what percentage go onto the next
year. If the percentages are less than 100 percent
retention, attrition and promotion were taken into
account.
c. The recruitment vector number is only used at the first
year point because all recruitment was at the first
year point and no lateral entries were included. If
lateral entries were to be included, their recruitment
vector numbers would be used at other year points.
d. BASEQN 10 shows that only ten year projections were
asked for. If a twenty year projection were asked for,
BASEQN 20 would be entered at this point.
e. Each row coincides with the N (initial class value)
,
i.e., row 1 equals E-l's to E-3's at the first year
point,...., row 10 is equal to E-7's.
Appendix D shows a step-by-step utilization of MANMOD as
the program exists in the Naval Postgraduate School's
computer.






OFFICER AND ENLISTED MANMOD PROJECTIONS
UNDER A CURRENT ACCESSION SCENARIO
Actual
FY 1990C FY 1990
d
FY 1990e
Actual Aviation Projections Proj ections
Designator FY 1980 FY 1981 Billet from FY 80 from FY 81
or Ratings Accessions Accessions Requirements Accessions Accessions
PILOT-LCDR
f












AD -E-7 1460 1260 215 306 264
-E-6 761 1078 930
-E-5 858 2517 2173





































AMS -E-7 981 881 195 228 205
-E-6 624 806 723
-E-5 800 1767 1586














-E-7 1502 1202 254 461 369
-E-6 429 1920 1537
-E-5 1833 3366 2694
-E-4 1736 1502 1202
































AW -E-7 618 548 59 150 133
-E-6 78 608 540
-E-5 234 1280 1135
-E-4 215 618 548
AX -E-7 325 295 20 127 115
-E-6 78 447 405
-E-5 98 728 661
-E-4 176 325 295
PR -E-7 251 211 79 67
-E-6 78 277 233
-E-5 254 530 445







This column (Actual FY 1980 Accessions) shows the actual
accessions at entry level into the various designators
and ratings for FY 198 0.
This column (Actual FY 1981 Accessions) shows the actual
accessions at entry level into the various designators
and ratings for FY 1981.
This column (FY 1990 Aviation Billet Requirements) shows
projected billet requirements for the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier aviation force by designator/rank and rating/
paygrade.
This column (FY 1990 Projections by FY 1980 Accessions)
shows the resulting number of individuals available in
each designator/rank and rating/paygrade in FY 1990 if
FY 1980 accession data were projected for ten years
(keeping accessions, attritions, retentions and promotion
rates constant at the FY 1980 levels)
.
This column (FY 1990 Projections by FY 1981 Accessions)
shows the resulting number of individuals available in




FY 1981 accession data were projected to FY 1990
(keeping attrition, retention and promotion rates
constant at the FY 1980 levels and accessions data
at the FY 1981 level)
.
f. By comparing the figures shown in the FY 1990 Aviation
Billet Requirements column with those in the last two
columns, one can find the overages and deficits of
manning as calculated by MANMOD,
to the LCDR level. Further, it must be noted that due to
the high attrition rate in this rank (LT) , a sufficiently
high number of these officers will leave the service prior
to becoming eligible for promotion to keep LCDR shortages
constant.
Closer examination of high attrition rates for LT" s (03)
shows the worst rates in the eighth and ninth years of service,
making it obvious that the bulk of the pilot LT's shown to be
available in Table XXXII (4487 in number) are in the first
three years of that rank zone. This creates a middle manage-
ment problem, not only later at the LCDR level, but also in
billets which require the experience of a senior LT, i.e.,
catapult/arresting gear officer. Manpower problems exist,
therefore, not only in terms of lack of personnel in total
numbers, but also in the distribution of the available per-
sonnel throughout their years of service. The results show
that there will be no manning problem in the rank cf LTJG if




The figures in Table XXXII indicate that NFO manning in
the fifteen carrier force airwings will not present a problem,
except at the LTJG level, where a deficit of 217 individuals
is found. However, these figures, like those for pilots,
presuppose that accession flows remain constant at the FY 80
and FY 81 levels and that retention and attrition figures do
not worsen at the eighth and ninth year point of service.
The enlisted figures in Table XXXII show, in almost all
cases, a larger quantity of individuals available, if current
accessions remain constant, than the fifteen carrier force
airwing manpower billet projections require. These availa-
bility figures, however, are subject to a fifty percent reduc-
tion since they include all Navy aviation enlistees in the
eleven chosen rates, and not just those available to be
assigned to the carrier airwings. The enlisted ratings
studied in this thesis are also used in Patrol Squadrons (P-3
aircraft) , sea-going helicopter squadrons (LAMPS) , and shore-
based activities (Fleet Composite Squadrons)
.
D. ENLISTED MANPOWER PROJECTIONS RESULTS
Tables XXXIII and XXXIV show only fifty percent of the
total number of accessions (FY 80 and FY 81 accession data
respectively) by ratings/paygrade projected to FY 90. The
fifty percent reduction in figures is based upon the fact that
fifty percent of all officers (pilots/NFO 1 s) trained are as-
signed to carrier airwing squadrons. This fact was derived




CARRIER ENLISTED AVIATION SHORTAGES/OVERAGES
BY ONE-HALF OF FY 1980 ACCESSIONS
FY 1990C (Shortages)/"^
One-Half3
h Manpower Supply Overages
:
FY 1990 Projections Supply
of Actual Aviation Using One-Half Compared to
Rating/ FY 1980 Billet of FY 1980 FY 90 Billet
Paygrade Accessions Requirements Accessions Requironents
AD -E-7 730 215 153 ( 62)
-E-6 761 539 (222)
-E-5 858 1259 401
-E-4 1131 692 (439)
AE -E-7 716 156 168 12
-E-6 1141 650 (491)
-E-5 1053 1448 395
-E-4 1073 716 (357)
AME -E-7 183 e —
—
—
-E-6 322 176 (146)
-E-5 410 385 ( 35)
-E-4 449 183 (266)
AMH -E-7 260 117 64 ( 53)
-E-6 410 229 (181)
-E-5 566 473 ( 93)
-E-4 624 241 (383)
AMS -E-7 491 195 114 ( 81)
-E-6 624 403 (221)
-E-5 800 884 84
-E-4 1095 458 (637)
AO -E-7 357 156 78 ( 78)
-E-6 624 285 (339)
-E-5 663 631 ( 32)
-E-4 741 348 (392)
AT -E-7 756 254 231 ( 23)
-E-6 429 960 531
-E-5 1833 1683 (150)
-E-4 1736 751 (985)
AQ -E-7 365 98 132 34
-E-6 215 632 417
-E-5 800 1185 385
-E-4 644 515 (129)





Actual a FY 199(T























































a. This column (One-Half of Actual FY 1980 Accessions)
shows a 50 percent reduction in the FY 1980 accession
data used in Table XXXII because it was assumed that
50 percent of the total accessions would not go to a
carrier airwing. (This percentage is based on the
fact that 50 percent of the aviation officer accessions
go to other than carrier airwings.)
b. This column (FY 1990 Aviation Billet Requirements) show
projected billet requirements for the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier aviation force by rating/paygrade.
c. This column (FY 1990 Manpower Projections by One-Half
of FY 1980 Accessions) is half of Table XXXII 's enlisted
FY 1990 Projections by FY 1980 Accessions section.
(Only half the accessed personnel were used because
this would be the amount of individuals if only half of
of the accessions were used)
.
d. This column ( (Shortages) /Overages from Accessions
Compared to FY 90 Billet Requirements) is the resultant
from subtracting the two previous columns from each
other. The numbers in parentheses are shortages.
e. No figures appear at these ratings/paygrades because
there are no aviation billet requirements at these
levels.




CARRIER ENLISTED AVIATION SHORTAGES/OVERAGES







of Actual Aviation Using One-Half Carpared to
Rating/ FY 1981 Billet of FY 1981 FY 90 Billet
Paygrade Accessions Requirements Accessions Pequirements
AD -E-7 630 215 132 ( 83)
-E-6 761 465 (306)
-E-5 858 1087 229
-E-4 1131 597 (534)
AE -E-7 716 156 168 12
-E-6 1141 650 (491)
-E-5 1053 1448 395




-E-6 322 176 (146)
-E-5 410 385 ( 35)
-E-4 449 183 (266)
AMH -E-7 260 117 64 ( 53)
-E-6 410 229 (181)
-E-5 566 473 ( 93)
-E-4 624 241 (383)
AMS -E-7 441 195 103 ( 92)
-E-6 624 362 (262)
-E-5 800 793 ( 7)
-E-4 1095 412 (683)
AO -E-7 357 156 78 ( 78)
-E-6 624 285 (339)
-E-5 663 631 ( 32)
-E-4 741 348 (392)
AT
-E-7 601 254 185 ( 79)
-E-6 429 769 340
-E-5 1833 1683 (486)
-E-4 1736 751 (1135)
A3
-E-7 365 98 132 34
-E-6 215 632 417
-E-5 800 1185 385
-E-4 644 515 (129)



























AW -E-7 274 59 67 8
-E-6 78 270 202
-E-5 234 568 334
-E-4 215 274 59
AX -E-7 148 20 58 38
-E-6 78 203 125
-E-5 98 332 234





-E-6 78 117 39
-E-5 254 223 ( 31)
-E-4 234 106 (128)
Notes
This column (One-Half of Actual FY 1981 Accessions)
shows a 50 percent reduction in the FY 1981 accession
data used in Table XXXII because it was assumed that
50 percent of the total accessions would not go to a
carrier airwing. (This percentage is based on the fact
that 50 percent of the aviation officers accessions go
to other than carrier airwings.)
This column (FY 1990 Aviation Billet Requirements) shows
projected billet requirements for the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier aviation force by rating/paygrade.
This column (FY 1990 Manpower Projections by One-Half
of FY 1981 Accessions) is half of Table XXXII' s enlisted
FY 1990 Projections by FY 1981 Accession section. (Only
half the accessed personnel were used because this would
be the amount of individuals if only half of the
accessions were used.)
This column ( (Shortages) /Overages from Accession Com-
pared to FY 90 Billet Requirements) is the result from
subtracting the two previous columns from each other.
The numbers in parens are shortages.
No figure appears at these ratings/paygrades because
there are no aviation billet requirements at these levels
Source: Compiled from Table XXXII.
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number of aviation students and to which type of aviation
field they are trained. The assumption is therefore made
that approximately 50 percent of the aviation enlisted acces-
sions would be required as a support factor for the seagoing
airwing squadrons to which these officers are assigned. It
is understood that these figures are approximate, but it was
not possible to refine the available data to show exact
billeting of individuals in each of the ratings discussed.
Deficits in the manning of the FY 90 carrier enlisted
airwing force, according to Tables XXXII and XXXIV, would
appear in the following ratings: AD, AE , AME, AMH, AMS , AO,
AT, with slight shortages also in AQ, AX and PR ratings at
the E-4 paygrade level only. Severe shortages are evident
in seven of the eleven ratings studied using both FY 80 or
FY 81 accession data. These shortages occur at almost all
levels, but particularly at the mid-management E-6 level.
In all of these ratings except for the AT rating shortages
increase dramatically from the E-5 to E-6 level. Replacement
of these trained and experienced individuals cannot be satis-
factorily achieved by increasing accessions. Increased
retention during the three-year promotion span from E-5 to
E-6 (minimum time in grade) seems a much more satisfactory
solution. Whether by increasing the percentage promoted,
shortening the promotion zone (time spent in paygrade) or
by offering more substantial financial incentives (reenlist-
ment bonuses/pay increases) it seems imperative to the
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feasibility of manning the enlisted billets of the FY 1990
carrier airwing force that more of the personnel in these
ratings (AD, AE, AME, AMH, AMS and AO) be induced to remain
past the E-5 and E-6 paygrade. This fact is driven home by
the knowledge that the Navy, at the beginning of this study,
was 20,000 to 22,000 middle grade petty officers undermanned.
E. ADDITIONAL AVIATION OFFICER AND ENLISTED SUPPLY-
DEMAND ANALYSES USING ACCESSIONS TO FILL BILLETS
Tables XXX and XXXI provide samples of results of addi-
tional MANMOD computer runs. Each paygrade grouping required
one computer run, i.e., for the officers there were three
computer runs each, and for the enlisted ratings, four com-
puter runs each. For each computer run, an R (recruitment
vector) was found by the trial and error method. The number
used for the R (recruitment vector) , for each computer run,
had to generate the required number or just exceed the man-
power billet projected requirements listed in Table XIV for
the officers and Table XIX for the enlisted. This was accom-
plished by increasing accessions at the entry level (E-l to
E-3) for enlisted and at the ENS (01) level for officers.
These numbers were then projected over the decade using attri-
tion, retention and promotion as variables. (On some computer
runs, the manpower billet requirements could not be exactly
fulfilled, so the R (recruitment vector) that would just
exceed the requirements was selected.)
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Table XXXV shows the actual number of annual entry level
accessions necessary to fill exactly the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier airwing billets by designator/rank and by rating/
paygrade.
In looking at the officer section of Table XXXV, one
sees that the pilot accessions requirements are larger than
those for the NFO's, with the required accessions for pilots
being almost twice those required for NFO's, except at the
LTJG level [Ref . 53] . The number of pilots needed is greater
because of the difference in retention rates between pilots
and NFO's.
In order to fill the FY 1990 fifteen carrier airwing force
requirements at the LCDR pilot level by use of a change in
accessions only, the Navy would have to start today annually
training almost twice as many new aviation student pilots as
being trained at present [Ref. 54]. The average student pilot
load for 1980 was 1,249 individuals and the average NFO load
was 552 [Ref. 55]. When these loads are compared with the
actual FY 1980 production of pilots and NFO's (Tables XX and
XXI) , one can see that the production of pilots is far behind
the projected requirements. In fact, for the Navy to meet
its FY 90 LCDR pilot requirements utilizing increased acces-
sions as the solution to its manning problem, the Navy would
have to start a massive pilot recruitment program (2173
annually)
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FY 1990 a Aviation Annual Entry Level
Designator Billets Required Accessions Required
or Ratings for 15 Carriers to Fill Billets Needed

















a. This column (FY 1990 Aviation Billets Required for 15
Carriers) shows projected billet requirements for the
FY 1990 fifteen carrier aviation force by designator/rank
and rating/paygrade.
b. This column (Annual Accessions Required to Fill Billets
Needed) shows the numbers of individuals who would have
to be accessed (at entry level) into each designator and
rating annually between the present time and FY 1990 in
order to provide the necessary numbers of personnel at
the ranks and paygrades shown in the Designator or Ranks
column for FY 1990. (Each accession figure shown in the
accession column was calculated solely for the designator/
rank and rate/paygrade opposite using the attrition,
retention and promotion data from FY 1980.)
c. The number 2173 which appears at the top of the accessions
column indicates the entry accessions, required yearly,
to provide 573 (billet requirements column) pilot LCDR's
by FY 1990. If only the LT pilots rank were considered,
then only 303 individuals would have to be accessed
annually to meet the FY 1990 requirements (1014 billets
required)
. (It is obvious, therefore, that changes in
accessions policies alone cannot solve the FY 1990 manning
problems, since no single accession figure provides ade-








d. No figures appear at these ratings/paygrades because
there are no aviation billet requirements at these
levels.
At this point, it becomes necessary to point out that
increased accessions, or indeed maintenance of FY 80 and FY
81 levels of accessions, may not be easily achieved over the
next decade. Demographic studies show a decreasing manpower
pool in the 17 to 24 year age group from which the Navy draws
the greatest part of its present accessions [Ref. 56]. Bear-
ing this in mind and remembering that the Navy is presently
20,000 to 22,000 midle grade petty officers undermanned, it
is evident that Naval aviation will have great difficulty in
combating the shortages seen occurring in pilot ranks and in
the enlisted ratings (AD, AE, AME, AMH, AMS and AO) by FY 1990
If accessions are not maintained, or in some cases increased,
as shown in Tables XXXIII and XXXIV, it becomes apparent that
the feasibility of adequately manning the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier airwing force is in serious question.
F. ALTERNATIVE RETENTION, ACCESSION AND PROMOTION POLICIES
Presently, the LT and LCDR (pilot) retention rates are at
only 30 percent. In order to achieve the FY 1990 airwing
pilot LCDR's required levels by use of accessions alone, the
Navy would have to access 2,173 entry level student pilots
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per annum. The column labeled "Retention Rates Change, All
Other Rates Remain Constant" in Table XXXVI shows that by
increasing the present retention rate (30 percent) to 66 per-
cent, the need for such massive numbers of new accessions
would be alleviated. A retention rate of 66 percent is quite
high, of course.
The projected supply of NFO LCDR's at FY 1990 is in excess
of the projected required billets. Should the Navy desire to
eliminate the overage, a change in promotion policy would be
required, lowering the present promotion rate from LT to LCDR
to 52 percent. (The present rate is 70 percent.) Such a
change in policy with respect to NFO's would, however, have
effects on both accessions and retention at earlier career
stages. It is, therefore, not recommended that such sharp
cuts in retention (by promotion policy changes) be adopted.
"The Retention and Promotion Rates Change, All Other Rates
Remain Constant" column of Table XXXVI shows the interaction
between promotion and retention rates for LT to LCDR ranks,
both pilots and NFO's. It was found that if the pilot promo-
tion rate (from LT to LCDR) was raised from 81 percent (present
day level) to 87 percent, and accession and attrition rates
remained constant, the retention level required to meet FY
1990 carrier airwing projected billets would be 60 percent
rather than the 66 percent shown in the previous column, where
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Lowering the numbers of NFO LCDR's from the present pro-
jected over supply to the levels required by the FY 1990
fifteen carrier airwings by use of promotion policy would
involve cutting promotions from the present day 8 percent
level to 58 percent. This figure (58 percent) and the analy-
sis assumes the present 70 percent retention rate would stay
intact. It is most unlikely that either accessions or
retentions could be kept at today's levels if the possibility
of promotions for NFO's to the rank of LCDR were reduced to
only 58 percent.
Increasing accessions was not considered as a viable
solution to the Navy's pilot problem because of demographic
trends over the next decade. The possibility of accessions
actually decreasing is worth consideration. Should this
reduction be only 150 individuals per annum (a reduction from
1339 to 1189 pilots per year) , an increase in pilot retention
rates from the present 30 percent to 75 percent would be
necessary, along with an increased promotion rate of 92 per-
cent (it is presently at 31 percent) . Obviously this acces-
sion decrease, or indeed any accession decrease, could worsen
severely the Navy's already serious pilot problem. If acces-
sions could be held constant, policies aimed at increased
retention, coupled with some increase in promotion rates,
seem to be the most viable approach to ensuring a force suf-
ficient to fill the pilot billets which the FY 1990 fifteen
carrier airwings will require.
Ill

Accession decreases, on the other hand, seen to be the
best way in which to reduce the NFO's at the LT to LCDR level.
Large reductions in promotions for mid-career officers could
have unpredictable results. A backlash might lead to fewer
accessions, or increased carrier attrition rates might
develop— either could cause an eventual deficit in numbers
of NFO's. An accession decrease of only 125 (a reduction
from 879 to 754 per year) at present day retention rates
would require only a 7 percent reduction in promotions (from
80 percent to 73 percent) in order to meet FY 1990 require-
ments. This accession decrease is recommended as the best
approach to containing the numbers of NFO LCDR's within re-
quired projected levels.
The enlisted rates, like the pilots, have been shown to
suffer their greatest losses at the mid-management level (E-5
to E-6 for enlisted) . This particular problem would not lend
itself readily to correction from increased accessions even
if the manpower pool were not diminishing as it is. With the
numbers of 17-21 year olds decreasing steadily over the next
ten years, policies aimed at improved retention are recommended
as the best solution to enlisted problems at all levels, but
particularly at the E-5 to E-6 level where the Navy is cur-
rently 20,000 to 22,000 petty officers undermanned. Increased
promotion rates, and the financial benefits inherent in such
rates, would also in all probability be an aid to providing
higher re-enlisted rates and help to provide the enlisted




The use of computer projections by Navy management level
personnel to enhance the effectiveness of long term accession,
retention and promotion policies can prove of great value.
In this thesis, the application of the MANMOD (Markov Chain
model) computer program to requirement, retention, accession,
promotion and attrition data has yielded an analysis of
alternative means for manning the fifteen carrier airwing
force in FY 1990.
It has been found that unless drastic overall changes are
made in retention figures, the FY 1990 carrier force will be
severely undermanned in most areas of its airwing complement.
There will be a 50 percent shortage of pilots if current trends
in retention continue until 1990. Attaining the required
number of NFO's, on the other hand, seems to present no prob-
lem. With the NFO retention rate at 7 percent and the NFO
promotion rate (LT to LCDR) above 8 percent, the Navy could
afford to reduce the number of NFO accessions and still meet
its requirements.
In terms of enlisted personnel, the Navy as a whole is
presently 20,000 to 22,000 middle grade petty officers under-
manned. The aviation community, as the CREO list (an example
was shown in Table XXIII) indicates, shares heavily in the
deficit. Aviation enlisted data contained in this thesis
113

show severe shortages in seven of the eleven enlisted ratings
studied, particularly at mid-management levels, and lesser
shortages in three other rates at the E-4 level. As the
fleet increases and demographic trends make maintaining ac-
cession levels more difficult, it becomes unrealistic for the
Navy to look to the new crop of 17 to 21 year olds to fill
its increasing billet requirements, or possibly even to main-
tain its current manning deficit levels.
A return to the draft would provide manpower at the entry
level; however, a more serious problem arises in the field of
middle management. Retention of personnel, once acquired,
must take a priority place in Navy's policy making. The
incentives to both officers and enlisted whose services are
in demand in the civilian job market must be such that the
personnel will remain.
Present aviation bonus incentives being offered to pilots
and NFO's, as well as special sea pay, indicate that Washington
has recognized the problem. Whether this new policy will be
sufficient to increase the pilot retention rate at the eight
or nine year point (LT to LCDR) to the rate needed remains
to be seen.
A change in promotion policy, with a more rapid advance-
ment potential and added financial rewards likely to be in-
herent in such a policy, might prove a valuable weapon in the
enlisted retention war. The young men in question (17 to 21
year olds) whose numbers are projected to decline until 1995,
are the source from which accessions are overwhelmingly made.
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This thesis concludes that of the officers and eleven
enlisted ratings studied, the following will be undermanned
in FY 1990 unless immediate policy changes are put into effect
Officers Pilots 131X
Enlisted AT, AD, AE, AME, AMH, AMS and AO—
severe deficits at most levels
Enlisted AQ, AX, PR—deficits at E-4 level
only.




Careful long term management of Navy manpower resources
will continue to be necessary over the coming years, particu-
larly in light of the increased demand for manpower and the
shrinking pool of accessible personnel. The utilization of
such vehicles as the APL program MANMOD in the projection of
data to make long term manning predictions can serve to
channel funding decisions and develop policies to maintain
the all-volunteer peacetime Navy and to provide for the




AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENTS FOR OFFICERS
AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
A-7E OFFICER
12 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Designator W2 01 02
Rank-
























AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
E-2C OFFICER
4 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Designator W2 01 02 03 04 05 TOTAL
130X 2 2
131X 6 4 1 11
132X 9 5 3 17
1520 1 1 2
1630 1 1
7380 1 1
TOTAL 1 2 15 10 4 2 34




AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
EA-6B OFFICER
4 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Designator W2 01 02
Rank-
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Source: NTP A-50-7703, Chief of Naval Operations OP-112D32
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AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
S-3A OFFICER
10 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Designator W2 01 02
Rank-

































AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
SH-3 OFFICER
6 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Designator W2 01 02
•Rank-










































AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENTS FOR ENLISTED
AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
A-7E ENLISTED
12 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5
Paygrade-























































































































CFNAVINST 5320. 102B, Chief of Naval Operations
OP-111E 125





Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
AD 2 2 3 3 2 12
AE 2 3 4 2 1 12




AMH 2 3 111 8
AMS 4 3 2 2 1 12
AN 27 27
APO 2 1 14
AT 5 8 8 3 2 1 27
AV 11
AZ 1 2 2 5
DK 1 1
HM 1 1
MS 2 2 4
PN 111 3
PO 3 1 4
PR 2 1 3
SN 2 2
YN 2 11 4
TOTAL 51 25 36 17 4 5 2 140




AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
EA-6B ENLISTED
4 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
ABH 1 1
AD 1 2 5 3 1 12
AE 2 5 4 2 1 14
AF 1 1
AK 1 3 4
AME 2 2 1 2 7
AMH 1 2 3 2 8







APO 2 1 3
AT 6 17 19 5 2 1 50




MS 2 2 4
PN 1 1 1 3
PO 2 2
PR 1 1 1 3
SN 1 1
YN 1 3 1 1 6
TOTAL 50 41 52 21 3 4 1 172








Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
AD 464511 21
AE 4 7 5 2 11 20
AF 11
AK 2 1 3 1 7
AM 11
AME 3 4 2 2 11
AMH 3 4 5 2 1 15
AMS 8 4 4 3 2 21
AN 45 45
AO 7 6 4 3 1 21
APO 2 1 14
AQ 4 74311 20
AT 3 6 5 2 1 17
AZ 2 2 2 1 7
DK 1 1
HM 1 1
MS 2 1 2 5
NC 11
OS
PN 1 1 1 1 4
PO 1 2 3
PR 2 2 1 5
SN 3 3
YN 3 2 1 6
TOTAL 96 54 47 30 7 5 2 241
Source: OPNAVINST 5320. 255B, Chief of Naval Operations OP-111C2
128

AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
F-14 ENLISTED
12 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
E7 E8 E9Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 TOTAL
AD 4 10 5 5 2 1 27
AE 5 7 7 3 1 1 24
AF 1 1
AK 2 1 3 1 7
AM 1 1
AME 2 4 3 2 11
AMH 4 4 5 3 1 17
AMS 6 5 5 3 1 20
AN 46 46
AO 7 6 5 3 1 22
APO 2 1 1 4
AQ 3 6 10 2 1 1 23
AT 5 7 8 1 1 1 23
AZ 1 2 2 1 6
DK 1 1
HM 1 1
MS 2 1 2 5
NC 1 1
OS 1 1
PN 1 1 1 1 4
PO 1 2 3
PR 1 1 2 4
SN 2 2
YN 3 2 1 6
TOTAL 91 59 66 28 9 4 3 260




AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
F/A-18 ENLISTED
12 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5
—Paygrade


























5 3 3 11 17
4 6 2 1 16




















A-50-7703, Chief of Naval Operations CP-112D32
2 2 1
3 4 4 1
5 4 3 1













39 54 27 5
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Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 Total
7 3 3 2 1 21
6 6 3 11 25
2 3 1 7
1 1
3 3 2 11
4 4 2 1 13
7 4 3 20
50
2 2 3 1 13
2 2 15
10 9 2 1 1 33
1 1
5 6 2 2 20
5 3 3 11 17
2 2 1 7
1 1
1 1
1 112 6111 4
2 212 1 8
2
2 1 6
59 56 30 9 4 3 275





























AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
SH-3 ENLISTED
6 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5
—Paygrade






























4 2 3 1
1 1 2
2 1
2 3 1 1








































AIRCRAFT SQUADRON MANPOWER DOCUMENT
RF-8 ENLISTED
6 AIRCRAFT SQUADRON
Rating E1-E3 E4 E5 E6
Paygrade-
E7 E8 E9 TOTAL
AD 1 2 4 2 1 10
AE 2 4 3 2 1 12
AK 1 3 4
AME 2 3 1 2 8
AMS 2 2 3 4 2 13
AN 27 27
APO 2 1 3
AT 6 15 16 4 2 1 44
AV 1 1
AZ 1 2 2 5
DK 1 1
HM 1 1
MS 2 2 4
PN 1 1 1 3
PO 2 2
PR 1 1 1 3
SN 1 1
YN 2 1 1 4
TOTAL 47 33 42 16 3 4 1 146








AD Aviation Machinist's Mate
AE Aviation Electrician's Mate
AME Aviation Structural Mechanic
(Safety Equipment)
AMH Aviation Structural Mechanic
(Hydraulics)
AMS Aviation Structural Mechanic
(Structures)
AO Aviation Ordnanceman
AQ Aviation Fire Control Technician
AT Aviation Electronics Technician
AW Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare
Operator
AX Aviation Antisubmarine Warfare
Technician




INSTRUCTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A MANMOD
COMPUTER RUN
After the MANMOD program is keyed into a computer work
space, the following steps are required in order to accom-
plish a computer run.
STEP 1 . When in the MANMOD APL program (at the Naval
Postgraduate School this is accomplished by logging
onto a computer terminal equipped for APL. First type
APL (press ENTER) , then press the ALT key and the APL
ON/OFF key simultaneously. Next, type LOAD MANMOD
(press ENTER) (The right paren is the orange printed
paren key pressed in conjunction with the upper case
key) (The only space required is between LOAD and
MANMOD) ) , type INPUT (press ENTER) . This starts the
MANMOD program.
STEP 2 . The program will request:
ENTER N (INITIAL CLASS VALUES)—This will be the initial
numbers (stocks) of individuals that are in each year
group selected for study. It is implicit in this speci-
fication that time is descrete and in practice the unit
of time will usually be a year. (In this thesis the
groups covered a nine or ten year period. So the N
vector would look like this for a nine year vector:
185 156 57 56 56 18 17 17 13.
STEP 3 . After the initial class values are entered via
the ENTER key, the program will request:
ENTER P (TRANSITION MATRIX)
ENTER 1TH ROW This is called the transition
matrix and each row vector is called the position vector.
It is also implicit that these specifications are time
descrete and are usually in year- units. The elements
of vector will be assigned numerical values and this is
accomplished by making hypothetical assumptions or by
estimating the probabilities from past data. The pro-
gram requires one row for each stock group entered in
step 2. The main diagonal shows the percentage of indi-
viduals remaining in a year group. To the left of the
main diagonal would be those individuals that are demoted
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On the right side of the diagonal would be the promotion
rates. In this thesis there was a continuous flow from
one year to the next with no one individual being re-
tained from one year group to the next and there are no
demotions. This allows only the assumptions/probabili-
ties to fall directly in the spaces to the right of the





STEP 4. After the P matrix is entered, the program will
request
:
ENTER NUMBER OF RECRUIT TYPE:
1 FIXED RECRUIT VECTOR
2 ADDITIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
3 MULTIPLICATIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)
4 ADDITIVE (SYSTEM SIZE)
5 MULTIPLICATIVE (SYSTEM SIZE) This gives
the operator the chance to choose various types of
recruitment systems. (This thesis used recruit type 1.
It would mean that over a ten year period, at 100
recruits per year, a total of 1000 recruits are re-
cruited. The additive and multiplicative aspect allows
a compound recruitment. Also, the additive and multi-
plicative mode can be applied to the whole system and
not just recruited at the first year point.
STEP 5. If other than number one was chosen from step 4,
additional information is requested as follows for each
case:
ADDITIVE (RECRUIT SIZE)—ENTER RPRCP (RECRUIT PROPORTION





(The request is the same
as above with the exception that the last request asks
for MULTIPLICATIVE FACTS (FAST) )
.
ADDITIVE OR MULTIPLICATIVE (SYSTEM SIZE) --ENTER RPROP
(RECRUIT PROPORTION VECTOR) with either ADDITIVE INCRE-
MENT (RSUM) or MULTIPLICATIVE FACTION (FACT) as required.
For additional information on recruit type selections,
contact Professor Milch at the Naval Postgraduate School.
STEP 6 . If number 1 was selected from Step 4, then only
the requirement ENTER R (RECRUITMENT VECTOR) is requested.
When all recruits are entered at the lowest level, the
vector will be as follows. The amount of recruits is
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placed first followed by zeroes for each year in N,
i.e., 100 0000000 0. There would be other numbers
in the vector if lateral entry was considered. (There
was no lateral entry considered in this thesis.)




1 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GRADE SIZE
2 GRADE SIZE AS PERCENTAGE OF ORIGINAL GRADE SIZE
Usually number one is chosen. (The percentage calcula-
tions will be in the output program next to the total
number in each year group.)
STEP 8 . In this step the program requests:
DO YOU WISH TO SEE INTERVENING YEARS
NO
1 YES
If 1 is chosen and it is desired to produce a program
that is calculated for 100 years, then the program will
show the figures from year through year 100. If a
look at each individual year is not desired, then a
selection of will give only the and 100 year.
STEP 9 . After step 8 is accomplished, the program will
show— END OF INPUT PROGRAM. At this point ask the pro-
gram to compute the data over a period of years. If a
ten year look is required, type in BASEQN 10, and if a
100 year look is needed, type in BASEQN 100. (The system
will only compute up to 999 years.) Once a year has been
selected, one cannot request that year or any year pre-
ceding without resetting. To reset, type RESET (press
ENTER) and reselect whatever year required.
STEP 10 . If changes to the original input data are
desired, the following procedure needs to be accomplished.
To change N(INITIAL CLASS VALUES) —type N«-x. Enter the
new values of N at x. The arrow is the APL orange arrow.
To change P (TRANSITION MATRIX) —type P(x;y) <- z . The x
is the row and the y is the column position where the
change is required. The z is the new value. Use the
orange parens (APL) typed without the upper case key
being depressed. The arrow is the same arrow as in the
above procedure. The semicolon is the orange APL
semicolon.
To change R (RECRUITMENT VECTOR) —type R-x. The new
values of R are recorded at x. The arrow is the APL arrow
used in the above procedures.
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To change INTERVENING YEARS— type LINES-*- x. The x will
either be a or a 1. The arrow is the same.
Other changes may be made to the program and for further
information contact Professor Milch, code 55 Mh, at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Also, all changes should be made after
resetting is accomplished unless specific changes eliminate
computational errors.
If a printed copy of the MANMOD computer run is desired,
then complete the following:
STEP 1 . After logging onto the computer type CP SPOOL
CONSOLE START * CLASS A (press ENTER) . This will start
a spool that will record all further entries into the
computer (mistakes included)
.
STEP 2 . Type APL (press ENTER) . This logs one into the
APL mode of. operation.
STEP 3 . Press the ALT key and the APL ON/OFF key at the
same time. This gives you control of the APL characters,
(orange colored keys)
.
STEP 4 . Type ) LOAD MANMOD (press ENTER) (the right paren
is the orange paren pressed in conjunction with the upper
case key) . This has recalled the MANMOD APL program.
STEP 5 . Type INPUT (press ENTER) . This starts the
program. Make all entries required.
STEP 6 . After the program run is completed, type ) OFF
HOLD (press ENTER) (the right paren is the same as the
one in step 4) . This places the computer back into the
CPU mode; (if) OFF is selected then the individual has
logged off the computer altogether)
.
STEP 7 . Type CP SPOOL CONSOLE CLOSE (press ENTER)
.
This stops information from being recorded on the spool.
STEP
|
8 . Type READ (Each underlined
section can have up to eight characters and will become
the file name for the computer run (press ENTER)
.
STEP 9
. Type CP SPOOL CONSOLE STOP (press ENTER)
.
This makes sure that the spool is no longer recording
and all information recorded is lost. (The READ
records program into personal storage
space.)* 138

STEP 10 . The new file can be printed by typing PRINT
(name given new file) or alternately
first go to XEDIT mode and add or erase information as
needed and then go to PRINT.
This file is now saved in the operator's personal







V INPUT \I \K\PI iERRMSG
Cl] ERRMSG*-' ERROR-. DIMENSION NOT COMPATIBLE WITH N -VECTOR,
TRY AGAIN'. '
[2] I«-l
[3] 'ENTER NUNITIAL CLASS VALUES)'
[4] N-,U
[5] K+pN
[6] 'enter 'pitransition matrix) by rows'
[7] p*-(k,k) p o







[15] 'ENTER NUMBER OE RECRUIT TYPE'
[16] ' 1 ?!*££ RECRUIT VECTOR'
[17] » 2 ADDITIVEiRECRUIT SIZE)'
[18] 3 MULTIPLICATIVEiRECRUIT SIZE)'
[19] f 4 ADDITIVEiSYSTEM SIZE)'
[20] » 5 MULTIPLICATIVEiSYSTEM SIZE)'
[21] rypfi^Q
[22] +(TYPE*1) /RPROPENTRY












[35] CHECKl:-»( {TYPE-^)^TYPE-b) / CHECK2
[36] 'ENTER RSIZEilNITAL RECRUIT TOTAL ENTERING SYSTEM)'
[37] PS7ZP«-Q
[38] CHECK2:-( (TYPE=3)vTYPE=5) IMULT









































GRADE SIZE AS PERCENT
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MIDLINE*-' X5,I2 t X t I9 t X'
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FIRST\2:FIRSTLINE\2 &FMT TCOUNT ,7 ,NlIl ,PERCENTlI]
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[ 6 ] TYPE-TYPE
[ 7 > f_-«-P
[8] ONE-(K-pN)p\\
[9] ANSWER-0 ROUND , (1 ,tf) pNINT-N







[17] ANSWER-ANSWER, 111 P0£/tf£ TCOUNT ,N-NINT+R
[18] !T02\4i>L(O.5 + 0tf£+.xtf)
[19] *( (TCOUNT=T)vLINES=\) /OUTPUTDATA
[20] -START
[21] OUTPUTDATA: TOTAL-l ( . S + 0NE+ . xtf )
[22] r02T£;?C£/VT«-L(O.5-t-lOOxrtf2M£ Z?iT T0T_AL)
[23] RSUM-L(Q.5+0NE+.xR)
[24] -{PC0DE= 1 2)/PCi4£Cl t PCALC2
[25] *sjrip
[26] PC,i4£C, l:P£i?C2tfr«-l(O.5 + lOOx//ir0r/4£)
[27] -SKIP










[ 2 ] iV«-£
[3] RPR0P-RPR0P
[4] TYPE-TYPE







[I] -(TYPE= 12 3 4 5)/0UT t ADDREC t MULTREC,ADDSYS t MULTSYS















1. "We'll Be Second to None/' John Lehman, Secretary of
the Navy, Campus—The Navy Education and Training
Monthly , April-May, 1981.
2. Historical Budget Data, Department of the Navy, Office
of the Comptroller, April 1979.
3. The Evolution of Military Officer Personnel Management
Policies; A Preliminary Study with Parallels from
Industry, Hayes, James H. , The Rand Corporation, August
1978.
4. Estimates of the Officer Force Structure Required to Man
the Projected Naval Combatant Forces of the 1980' s and"
1990's : Alden, E.V. , October 1980.
5. Setting National Priorities—The 1978 Budget . Pechman,
Joseph A. (Editor) , The Brookings Institute, Washington,
D.C., 1978.
6. Janes Fighting Ships, 1971-1972 Edition y Sampson Low,
Marston & Co., LTD, London.
7. Ibid.
8. Janes Fighting Ships, 1974-1975 Edition , Franklin Watts,
Inc. , New York.
9. Janes Fighting Ships, 1972-1973 Edition , Sampson Low,
Marston & Co., LTD, London.






12. "Meeting the Challenge," Seymour, Ernest R. , Vice Admiral,









19. Department of the Navy OP-01.
20. Janes, 1980.
21. "SECNAV Stresses Retention, n MacDonald, Scot, Surface
Warfare , August 1981.
22. Janes Fighting Ships, 1976-1977 Edition , Franklin Watts,
Inc. , New York.
23. Janes, 1980.




28. "Who'll Fight for America, Time , 9 June 1980.
29. Ibid.
30. "Anchors Aweigh," Buchwald, Art, Monterey Peninsula
Herald
, 17 March 1981.
31. Time , 9 June 1980.
32. "Wrong Target," Anderson, Jack, Monterey Peninsula
Herald , 21 March 1981.





36. Trained USAF, Navy Pilots Resigning in Huge Numbers,
Janish, R.J., Armed Forces Journal International, October
1978. —
37. Retention of Highly Trained Poses Service Problems,
Aviation Week & Space Technology
, Giffiths, David R.
,
5 November 197 9.
145

38. "Nobody Asked Me, But," Woodfield, J.R., LCDR, Proceed-
ings , 1 June 1979, page 94.
39. Anderson & Giffiths.
40. OPNAVINS 1133.3, 8 January 1980.
41. A First-Term Attrition Severity Index for U.S. Navy
Ratings , Griffin, Patricia, Naval Postgraduate School
Thesis, 8 June 1981.
42. Refitting Four Historic Battleships— $2 Billion Bargain
or Boondoggle, Webbe, Stephen, Christian Science Monitor
,
6 March 1981, page 1.
43. First Term Survival and Reenlistment Chances for Navy
Ratings and a Strategy for Their Use . " Thomason, James S.
,
Center for Naval Analysis (CRC 382) May 1979.
44. Navy Military Personnel Statistics , Naval Military Per-
sonnel Command (NMPC-DSS) , 17 March 1981.
45. Statistical Techniques for Manpower Planning , Bartholomew,







51. Chief of Naval Education and Training, CNATRA Forms
1542/45, Pilot/NFO Work Sheets, Mr. Puts, N313.
52. Accession Data from NMPC 4 82 for FY 8 and FY 81, LCDR
Sheehand.
53. Military Manpower Training Report for 1981 . Department
of Defense, March 198 0.
54. Puts.
55. Puts.
56. POD and Navy Manpower Supply Scenarios Through Year 2000 .
Gressines, David W. and Kim, Kwan, Mathtec Inc., Bethesda,





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor Richard Elster, Code 54 Ea 3
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor Ronald A. Weitzman, Code 54 Wz 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Professor Paul R. Milch, Code 55 Ma 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
7. Lt. John J. Infield, USN 3
Star Rt. , Box 179
New York Road












the feasiK^ • °n of
^
feasibility of









of the projected FY
1990 carrier force.
thesl423
An investigation of the feasibility of m
3 2768 002 10238 6
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
'$mm
HMO
